



UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL COHESION AND PEACE CAPACITIES

SCORE South Sudan Policy Report



THE CENTRE FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE AND
DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT

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Lead authors: Christopher Louise and Alexander Guest

Co-authors: Amie Scheerder and Natasha Ereira-Guyer

Data analysts: Georgia Christou, Marian Machlouzarides, Christoforos Pissarides

Fieldwork company: Forcier Consulting Ltd.

Cover page image

South Sudan: Displacement in Unity

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UN protected site in Bentiu.

WHAT IS THIS REPORT?

SCORE South Sudan is a response to the demand to better understand the complexity of restoring social cohesion and building peace in the country. The project seeks to provide high level policy advice to decision-makers in the Government and the donor community on what kind of peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives will be most effective in supporting the implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS)¹, and establish solid foundations for sustaining peace and preventing the resumption of conflict.

SCORE findings are based on the analysis of a household survey which was administered to 2,139 people in 69 Bomas in five regions: Aweil, Bor, Bentiu, Rumbek and Yambio. Data collection took place in two phases. The first regions surveyed were Aweil, Bor and Yambio between 1 November and 10 December 2019. The second phase was administered in the regions of Bentiu and Rumbek between 23 March and 15 April 2020. The second phase was interrupted due to restrictions on interstate travel in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Data collection was resumed only in Rumbek on 12 June and surveying was completed on 15 June 2020. The bomas surveyed were urban and peri-urban districts within and in close proximity to the 5 state capitals (See Annex I for a detailed explanation of the research methodology).

South Sudanese key informants helped shape the SCORE research parameters during a SeeD calibration mission to Juba in September 2019. This exercise defined three key SCORE research questions: 1) what are the principal components of social cohesion in South Sudan? 2) what drives support for the peace agreement? and 3) what are the root causes of civilian militarization? The research process sought to respond to these questions and by using advanced statistical analysis methods provide predictive models for understanding the citizenship choices of respondents within the wider socio-political and economic context which may govern individual or community behaviours. From this perspective SCORE's most pertinent contribution to understanding the complex emergency in South Sudan is through the lens of those citizenship qualities required to deepen a durable sustaining peace and development agenda.

¹ Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 12 September 2018

ANALYTICAL SCOPE OF THE REPORT

The analytical scope of this report is limited to assessing the impact of the conflict on different dimensions of social cohesion, with a view to informing effective responses. Neither this report nor SCORE seeks to address the origins of the conflict nor is it able to analyse the past or current political dimensions of the conflict. The authors recognize that the conflict in South Sudan has complex historical and international dimensions that are far beyond the scope of the SCORE indicators. As such, this report neither seeks to provide a conflict analysis nor to diagnose the root causes of the conflict, but focuses instead on revealing perceptions that shape the current realities in which citizens interact with the consequences of conflict and other adversities which impact their lives.

In this context the SCORE analysis puts individual behaviours and choices at the centre of the social cohesion concept, which can be seen as having objective and subjective dimensions. Objective factors relate to social, political and economic factors which shape the environment in which citizens operate. Subjective factors look at the values, attitudes, and beliefs of individuals. This report analyses the interaction between these individual subjective citizenship choices and the objective contextual factors which shape those choices and behaviours.

Findings relate to the attitudes and opinions of communities in the urban areas of Aweil, Bentiu, Bor, Rumbek and Yambio and the peri urban Bomas in close proximity to these state capitals. The authors recognise that capturing responses from rural and deep rural areas in each state may have delivered different research outcomes and in this regard, this *potentially* represents a limitation to the scope of the study and its conclusions. The disruption caused by COVID-19 prevented the data collection company from completing the full sample size in Bentiu and 60% of the originally agreed sample were collected in this region. However, SeeD took every precaution to ensure that the analysis was adequately compensated and only results which have a high degree of confidence are published for Bentiu.

KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS

SCORE uses key indicators to measure concepts associated with individual cognitive skills and traits. Many of these can be described as life skills or soft skills. In SCORE they are presented as citizenship qualities which are closely associated to particular kinds of behaviours or attitudes, such as the decision to possess a gun, the embrace of other ethnic groups or support for the peace agreement. Throughout this policy paper these concepts will often be used to represent individual drivers which help explain the choices citizens make. The most important of these are described below.

Callousness	Lack of concern for the feelings or problems of others, including the absence of guilt or remorse about the negative or harmful effects of one's actions on others.
Civic adherence	Respect for the rule of law, and to adhering to civic duties, e.g. paying taxes and obeying the law.
Community cooperation	The degree to which one feels that their community supports its members, who cooperate to solve common problems.
Constructive citizenship	Denotes a readiness to participate in civic initiatives such as youth forums, while opposing violence as a means to achieve political goals.
Cultural distance	The extent to which people feel their own culture is dissimilar to the culture of another ethnic group.
Family connectedness	Parental involvement, positive relations with all family members and a sense of shared purpose within the family.
Gender equality mindset	Attitudes and actions which afford equal rights and opportunities to people of all genders.
Growth mindset	Appreciation that skills and intelligence are not static, but may be nurtured, developed, and improved
Impulsivity	Acting on the spur of the moment in response to immediate stimuli without a plan or consideration for the consequences.
Inclusive civic identity	The degree to which one describes one's identity in terms of common national culture and a sense of shared inheritance, transcending ethnic differences.
Inclusive collaboration	The skill of building consensus and helping to resolve disagreements. Openness to alternative opinions and embraces multiple perspectives.
Intergroup harmony	The extent to which people trust and have positive feelings towards other ethnic groups, particularly those which are considered "outgroups"
Passive citizenship	The endorsement of the status quo and lacking the will to do anything to facilitate social change, with a preference to focus on personal affairs.
Peaceful citizenship	Measures people's tendency to choose peaceful means over violent responses to conflict-related situations, even when violence is used by others.
Political tribalism	Denotes loyalty to 'tribal hierarchies and traditional way of life' instead of 'democratic governance structures and values'.

Prosocial orientation	Voluntary actions that benefit others, prompted by empathy, moral values and a sense of personal responsibility rather than a desire for personal gain.
Vindictiveness	Being strongly vengeful towards other people.
Violent citizenship	The use of all available means for change in society including violence. It includes the propensity to use of violence in response to social conflict, political disputes and the exercise of power in gendered relationships.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Social cohesion is a property of society that is broadly essential to inclusive development and to conflict prevention. Cohesive societies with high levels of everyday trust, a shared vision for a common future, and responsive and legitimate governance institutions contribute to economic development through inclusive social policies and protection². The Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index (SCORE) for South Sudan assesses the impact of the conflict on different dimensions of social cohesion. The data-driven findings of this report are intended to inform evidence-based decision-making, allowing policymakers to use credible research findings to formulate policies and programmes which have a strong likelihood of leveraging positive social impact. The analysis in this report is based on findings from 5 regions of the country: Aweil, Bentiu, Bor, Rumbek and Yambio.

People in South Sudan have suffered prolonged and sustained trauma through war, natural disasters and internecine violence. This has undermined people's basic fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to life. This policy report shows that the greatest threat to social cohesion is the breakdown of intergroup relations and the absence of tangible peace dividends, underpinned by the fear of violence and low levels of constructive civic engagement. The analysis also demonstrates the diversity of conflict sources which are highly contextual and reflect local dynamics. This speaks to the need to foster cohesion through local leaders, the community, and strengthening civic spaces where the individual can fully participate in the decisions impacting the community.

Strengthen peaceful citizenship

Social Cohesion was measured through six indicators which proved to be instrumental in shaping social interactions between different groups in society: inter-generational cohesion, peaceful citizenship, intergroup harmony with other groups, community cooperation, inclusive civic identity and readiness for violence. Each indicator was assigned a score based on the results of the household survey. Scores were calculated for each indicator in each region and composite scores calculated for all five regions. Scores are measured on a scale of 0-10, with 0 indicating the lowest level of social cohesion, and 10 denoting the highest level of societal cohesiveness. In general, strong social cohesion trends are represented by scores of 8 and above. In South Sudan social cohesion in each of the 5 regions is medium low with Bentiu and Yambio scoring lowest with 5.5, and the other three regions scoring below 7.

Peaceful citizenship proves to be the most influential SCORE indicator governing the behaviour of other key indicators and policy implications. This indicator measures the tendency of people to choose peaceful means over violent responses to conflict-related situations, even when violence is used by others. The importance attached to the indicator lies in the constellation of other behaviours associated with a peaceful citizenship

² Strengthening Social Cohesion for Sustaining Peace, A Guidance Note for Analysis and Programming, United Nations Development Program Bureau for Policy and Program Support.

orientation. For example, peaceful citizenship predicts intergroup harmony and is the strongest correlate of support for the peace process. From a policy perspective the drivers (predictors) of peaceful citizenship are a constellation of good governance and dispositional qualities which can be strengthened through policy and programme interventions. The strongest good governance qualities relate to the ability and inclination of citizens to participate in civic life and the observance of the rule of law.

On the other hand, the opposite of peaceful citizenship – readiness for violence – is strongly predicted by people’s exposure to economic shocks. SCORE found that while most people (69 percent) fell into the peaceful citizenship category, 3 percent were strongly predisposed to violence and another 15 percent of people were as likely to use violence as peaceful means to address conflict situations. The people in the group which would use both violence and peaceful methods are also most willing to participate in civic affairs. This finding underlies the premise that the most active citizens have the potential to be constructive – build their communities, or destructive – to act violently. It highlights how violence in South Sudan *may often* come about because citizens who want to solve communal problems do not have the option of using peaceful vehicles to navigate conflictive situations, pointing to the need for strengthened local conflict resolution mechanisms. Finally, the analysis underwrites the causal relationship between poverty and unemployment and conflict in South Sudan. “Peaceful citizens” were found to have a higher level of Household Dietary Diversity and the lowest level of average members of the household who are unemployed, while people who are most likely to be violent live in households with an average of 7 unemployed family members.

Safeguard R-ARCSS through hope in a peace dividend

SCORE assessed support for the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) by asking respondents seven questions relating to both the letter and the spirit of the peace agreement. Although there is overall strong support for the agreement, with 63 percent of respondents strongly supporting it, 31 percent of people expressed reservations about the agreement. The highest concentration of people who are not fully convinced by the peace agreement is in Bentiu (71 percent), followed by Bor (46 percent), Rumbek (36 percent), Aweil (30 percent), and Yambio (18 percent). Bentiu and Bor show the greatest concentration of people which are unconvinced by R-ARCSS provisions, requiring exploration into why the peace process appears to be failing to inspire trust among communities in these regions.

SCORE shows that hope in the peace process, and the belief it will bring benefits to people is the strongest driver for supporting R-ARCSS. This is helped by a belief in the rule of law and support for a strong South Sudanese identity which transcends ethnic differences (inclusive civic identity). People who embrace these philosophies are most likely to support the R-ARCSS. While on average 78 percent of people from Yambio, Aweil, Bor and Rumbek are strongly confident (totally agree) the peace process will benefit their community only 40 percent of people in Bentiu, which expressed the highest level of skepticism about R-ARCSS,

feel the same (although 44% of people in Bentiu *somewhat agree* benefits will come to their community). Different regions demonstrate varying emphasis for key drivers in support of the peace agreement, but overall the most featured predictors for embracing the agreement gravitate towards hope in the peace process, the rule of law (civic adherence) and citizen traits which strengthen community collaboration.

On the other hand, there are specific drivers which weaken support for the peace agreement, and these are the issues which require attention to ensure the peace process does not falter at the political or societal level. The cluster of factors which decrease support for R-ARCSS can possibly be seen through the lens of particular interest groups in society. These are people who have a higher income and strong ties to cattle herding and may have narrow politico-ethnic based interests (political tribalism). In combination with some individual traits which imply a preference to pursue self-interest over the common social good (callousness), this points to a group which perceives the peace agreement and its provisions as potentially threatening their privileges, and established power structures.

Invest in local peace infrastructures

SCORE shows that sustaining peace cannot be achieved without removing the root causes of insecurity in local communities. This level of insecurity is reflected through the possession of firearms by civilians and the perception that civilian armament is a problem in the community. The citizens of Yambio, Bor and Rumbek unanimously perceive guns as a problem. Citizens in these three regions also report the highest levels of assaults, robberies, uncontrolled militias and cattle raiding. UNDP's 2017 National Small Arms Assessment asserted that 97% of people allege a weapon was used when a violent incident occurred, while estimating that there was an average of 1.39 firearms per household³. SCORE shows that while most citizens support gun reduction, 19% of people express reservations and this reluctance to disarm reflects the need to invest in constitutional vehicles for protecting life and property.

Connecting these findings with the analysis on peaceful citizenship, it is clear that investments in infrastructures for peace which are underpinned by the rule of law are a priority for the country's sustaining peace agenda. SCORE results show how societal demilitarization is motivated mostly by faith in a functioning justice system, ahead of traditional "hard" security responses, such as increased police and army presence in communities. Even more significant, those people who are not unequivocal about giving up their guns still consider a strong justice system as being the most likely route for civilian disarmament. This is further validated by analyses which demonstrates that core civic qualities such as peaceful citizenship, embracing intergroup harmony, inclusive collaboration and a gender equality mindset are all strong correlates of civilian disarmament.

³ National Small Arms Assessment in South Sudan, UNDP, 2017

A mapping of peace infrastructure actors – those deemed most responsible for resolving inter-communal conflicts – showed that the communities with the lowest social cohesion scores (Bentiu and Yambio) generally expressed the least confidence in the state authorities to resolve such conflicts. In these regions non-state actors, such as religious leaders and women leaders have a higher approval rating than state bodies. SCORE shows that women are an untapped resource for restoring social cohesion and strengthening peace consolidation efforts.

Communities have a high regard for the Chief and the Peace Committees, expressing confidence in these actors to underwrite peaceful relations between communities. Arguably there is peace infrastructure nexus between the Chief – peace committee and the community. The community trusts both the Chief and the Peace Committee and there is a desire to see an effective Chief in local affairs. Chiefs are regarded as being the most important authority in the community and citizens most believe Chiefs are effective in their respective roles. Generally, Peace Committees are unanimously trusted by the respective community. The Chiefs in all five regions overwhelmingly agree that South Sudan's politicians must work to implement the peace agreement. SCORE shows that the role, authority and personality of the Chief influence communities' approach to the peace process and peaceful citizenship. In Bomas where the chief has good negotiation skills and is more independent, the community tends to be more peaceful. One of the major challenges is the need to invest more in these localized peace infrastructures which people trust. Chiefs asked for training in how to harmonise the traditional system of justice with the modern system, and how to reconcile international human rights and gender rights laws with customary laws. The Chiefs in all the regions report that the resources available for the local peace committees are inadequate. Investing in the capacities local infrastructures for peace should gravitate around the Chief's role where the Chief's functions are modernized and cultivated to be local peace and development champions, with a relevant level of decision-making autonomy.

There is a key role for mental health care in the process of peacebuilding in South Sudan. This is evidenced through the SCORE results showing a correlation between weak capacities to forgive, measured through the propensity of people to be vindictive and vengeful, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). At the same time vindictiveness is a driver of readiness for violence and this link sheds light on one of the most concerning dimensions of conflict exposure in South Sudan. The potential of trauma to compromise efforts to reconcile and rebuild societies after violent conflict is increasingly recognized by the peacebuilding and development communities. In South Sudan the disinclination to forgive (level of vindictiveness) has a regional characteristic with some communities potentially resisting reconciliation efforts in the absence of well-designed and targeted socio-psychological interventions.

KEY POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. *Invest in civic engagement activities to strengthen peaceful citizenship.* This should focus on creating the right kind of conditions which encourage citizens to channel their active civic orientation and energy into peaceful and constructive methods for supporting peace. Local public awareness campaigns which celebrate peaceful and constructive citizenship would greatly support an overall policy goal of building local capacities for conflict prevention and management, while encouraging active citizenship. It is important to ensure active and peaceful citizenship programmes and policies are underpinned by livelihoods programmes which demonstrate a peace dividend. Vocational training should include citizenship modules which emphasize the importance of prosocial orientation, civic adherence and dialogue.
2. *Strengthen the role of women in the peace process and remove barriers to the appointment of women Chiefs.* Women are an untapped asset and resource for peace consolidation. SCORE evidence demonstrates that given the right kind of enabling environment women are effective community leaders which can navigate and embolden local peace infrastructures. Improving the political participation of women provides one important route to peace consolidation, and this can be assisted by removing barriers to women becoming Chiefs in their communities. Women Chiefs in the SCORE study are particularly able to influence community cohesion, while more prominent women community leaders would help focus attention on how the peace process responds to the issues which impact women's lives. The international donor community should increase support for women's organisations, which are already recognised as trusted and effective peace infrastructures in local communities.
3. *Expand children's access to school environments and help to develop a citizenship value from an early age.* Poor access to schools is the main driver undermining peaceful citizenship, and SCORE shows that it is the school environment rather than educational attainment which strengthens peaceful citizenship. Making school-like environments easy to access need to be a priority for communities seeking to strengthen their peaceful citizenship and civic engagement capacities.
4. *Strengthen the capacity for peaceful dialogue.* Although readiness for violence does exist there is a dominant trend towards dialogue, and this needs to be consolidated as the primary currency for strengthening peaceful citizenship. In this regard more investment in peace infrastructures which give primacy to conflict resolution at the local level should be emphasized. Actors which are trusted by the community, such as the Chief, religious leaders and professional people should be provided with the right kind of training and resources to serve as peace and development ambassadors.
5. *Invest in community cooperation projects which connect different ethnic groups, demonstrates an inclusive peace dividend and fosters hope in the peace process.*

Community cooperation is an important civic asset which is strongly associated with peaceful citizenship and other constructive citizenship traits such as civic engagement, inclusive collaboration and inclusive civic identity. This provides an entry point for development projects which provide the space for rival communities to cooperate and which demonstrate a mutual peace dividend. Targeted investments in projects which mobilise communities around concrete economic and cultural benefits should be prioritised. These projects need to be highly participative and provide decision-making mechanisms that ensure community ownership of process and results. The benefits from such projects should be tightly correlated with building local community understanding of R-ARCSS and the benefits peace will bring.

6. *Prevent post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) hindering processes of national reconciliation.* The intrinsic interlinkage between peacebuilding and mental health and psychosocial support is internationally recognized⁴. SCORE shows that PTSD undermines hope in the peace process and the quality of intergroup harmony, while feelings of revenge (inability to forgive) is a driver for potential future violence. The negative consequences of poor mental health among people struggling to recover from trauma could be severe for policymakers seeking to implement R-ARCSS. Creating a bulwark against loss of faith in the peace process and addressing the individual traumas of citizens through professional and targeted counselling services needs to be a priority for peacebuilding programmes. This requires inter-agency collaboration which supports national healing and connects the expertise of local and international mental health experts with good governance programming best practices.


⁴ Katrien Hertog, The intrinsic interlinkage between peacebuilding and mental health and psychosocial support: The International Association for Human Values model of integrated psychosocial peacebuilding, 2017

SECTION A: SOCIAL COHESION DYNAMICS UNDERPINNING THE PROCESS OF PEACE CONSOLIDATION

A profile of community trauma

The SCORE study in the five regions selected for this pilot research project (Aweil, Bor, Bentiu, Rumbek and Yambio) identifies the devastating impact of conflict on people's ability to meet their basic needs (figure 1). The denial of basic needs and the trauma experienced by people impacts social cohesion capacities at the community level. The majority of respondents in the SCORE household survey (87 percent) have at some point been unable to buy food due to high prices, while 70 percent of people have run out of food. SCORE calculated the Food Consumption SCORE (level of food people consumed in a week) for the five regions as 2.5 out of 10 (Aweil scored the highest at 3.1 and Bentiu the lowest with a value of 1.5). Conflict has denied significant segments of the population access to schools and health centres (61 percent) and markets (60 percent). One-third of people have suffered conflict-related injuries and almost half the population (49 percent) has witnessed combat. Conflict-related adversities has been compounded by hardships due to natural disasters, with 64 percent of people losing crops due to pests and 53 percent of people's crops affected by flood.

Figure 1: Percentage of people in the five regions who experienced different kinds of adversities or traumatic incidents



The overall impact of conflict on human life is exhibited in results from a London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine study (2018) which estimates that 190,000 people have been killed during the civil war period from 2013-2018⁵. The level of conflict exposure accompanying this loss of life differs between regions (figure 2) with people in Bentiu, Yambio and Bor being most severely affected, whereas people in Aweil have avoided largescale conflict. Citizens in Aweil tend to experience more economic shocks with 77 percent indicating their crops have been affected by floods. Similar exposure to environmental adversities can be observed in Rumbek whereas people in Bor and Yambio feel directly affected by both violent conflict and economic challenges. In Bentiu, people are the most exposed to violence with 90 percent witnessing a combat situation and 85 percent reporting they have been physically injured or became disabled due to a combat situation.

Figure 2: Conflict exposure by region




Figure 3 below describes the main causes of conflict on a scale of 0-10 (where 0 denotes no cause and 10 denotes the major cause of conflict), as reported by the Chiefs of the respective regions. Chiefs reported the presence of various types of conflict occurring in their community ranging from disputes within families and between bomas covering personal and interpersonal issues over cattle, natural resources, and property. Most conflicts in the community are linked to the national political conflict, poverty, unemployment, lack of rule of law, corruption and weak conflict resolution mechanisms.

⁵ London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Estimates of crisis attributable mortality in South Sudan, December 2013 April 2018, September 2018, p.23

Figure 3: Chief's assessment of the cause of conflict

Cause of Conflict	Aweil	Bor	Yambio	Bentiu	Rumbek	Five-region average
National political conflict	9.3	8.8	10.0	9.4	10.0	9.5
Unemployment	10.0	7.5	10.0	8.4	9.9	9.2
Poverty	10.0	8.8	10.0	6.9	9.6	9.1
Lack of the rule of law	9.3	6.2	10.0	9.4	10.0	9.0
Weak conflict resolution mechanisms	10.0	6.0	10.0	8.4	9.9	8.9
Corruption	10.0	7.2	10.0	7.3	9.8	8.9
Guns in the community	5.2	8.8	10.0	8.7	10.0	8.5
Tribalism	0	10.0	9.0	9.4	9.7	7.6
Inter-ethnic tensions	0.6	9.0	8.4	9.4	10.0	7.5
Inter-communal tensions between villages and towns	0.0	6.2	7.0	10.0	10.0	6.6
Misunderstanding between government and the community	5.2	0.2	10.0	8.4	1.9	5.1
Domestic disputes in the family/household	4.4	0	10.0	4.5	4.8	4.7
Tensions between young people and older people	2.5	0.2	9.5	8.7	1.5	4.5

Most regions have a wide spread of severe conflict drivers. Chiefs in all regions reported they are able to solve most conflicts, although in some regions, like Yambio, a high number of disputes are likely to turn violent. Chiefs report that disputes between different ethnic groups and with a political dimension are the most challenging to resolve.

Overview of social cohesion

The quality of social cohesion in South Sudan was assessed in this context of conflict exposure and the capacity of communities to manage disputes peacefully. The analysis affirms the widely acknowledged premise that social cohesion is a multi-dimensional concept, and in recent years the United Nations has linked the concept with organic approaches for conflict prevention. UNDP's guidance note on social cohesion describes the concept in the following way:

“Social cohesion is a property of society that is broadly essential to inclusive development and to conflict prevention. Cohesive societies with high levels of everyday trust, a shared vision for a common future, and responsive and legitimate governance institutions contribute to economic development through inclusive social policies and protection. And, particularly in societies vulnerable to violence – particularly those divided along ethnic,

racial, religious, sectarian, language, or other identity lines of division – such cohesion reflects the desire to live together in harmony with a shared or common destiny”⁶.

In Africa social cohesion has been conceptualized through the rich tradition of **Ubuntu**, which is an ancient African code of ethics, emphasizing the importance of hospitality, generosity, respect for all members of the community, and embraces the view that we all belong to one human family. Ubuntu is found in diverse forms in many societies throughout Africa, and especially among the Bantu languages of Eastern, Central and Southern Africa, where the notion is a cultural world view that tries to capture the essence of what it means to be human.⁷

These definitions emphasize the role of the citizen and citizenship qualities as a critical currency of social cohesion. This puts individual behaviours and choices at the centre of the social cohesion concept, which can be seen as having objective and subjective dimensions. The objective dimension aligns with the contextual factors which shape the environment in which citizens operate, while subjective factors “direct attention toward values, attitudes, and beliefs that social actors develop toward the state and toward other ethnic and religious groups within the state”.⁸ Our concept of social cohesion is a framework for the interaction between individual subjective citizenship choices and the objective contextual factors which shape those choices and behaviours. Therefore, SCORE seeks to measure and understand the relationship between individual preferences and the environment influencing those preferences. We are assisted in this endeavour by measuring a set of life skills which are proved to govern individual world views and the choices and behaviours.

Life skills are a broad set of social and behavioral skills—also referred to as “soft” skills—that enable individuals to deal effectively with the demands of everyday life. This includes decision-making (critical and creative thinking, and problem solving); community living (effective communication, resisting peer pressure, building healthy relationships, and conflict resolution); and personal awareness and management (self-awareness, self-esteem, managing emotions, assertiveness, stress management, and sexual and reproductive health behaviors and attitudes). Chronic deficits in life skills reduces capacities for constructive citizenship and is underpinned by social, political and psychological powerlessness. Ultimately, the interplay between life-skills and citizenship defines how well citizens can assert their rights-holders’ entitlements and take control of the socio-political decision-making processes which impacts their lives.

Scores for social cohesion in South Sudan are measured through six indicators which proved to be instrumental in shaping social interactions between different groups in society. The overall 5-region average for social cohesion is 6.2 which is a low to middle assessment of the state of cohesiveness in the regions assessed for the South Sudan SCORE project.

⁶ Strengthening Social Cohesion for Sustaining Peace, A Guidance Note for Analysis and Programming, United Nations Development Program Bureau for Policy and Program Support.

⁷ The state of Social Cohesion in Eastern Africa, 23rd Inter-governmental Committee of Senior Officials and Experts for Eastern Africa, 5-7 November 2019, Asmara, Eritrea, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.

⁸ Strengthening Social Cohesion for Sustaining Peace, A Guidance Note for Analysis and Programming.

Figure 4: Scores for social cohesion

Social cohesion component	Aweil	Bor	Yambio	Bentiu	Rumbek	Five-Region Average
Inter-Generational Cohesion	8.4	8.8	5.5	7.5	8.6	7.8
Peaceful Citizenship	6.9	7.7	7.0	5.8	8.4	7.2
Intergroup Harmony with Outgroups	4.1	1.8	2.0	3.5	1.7	2.6
Community Cooperation	4.0	2.8	3.4	3.7	7.1	4.2
Inclusive Civic Identity	8.1	7.4	6.7	6.9	7.7	7.4
Readiness for Violence	0.8	0.6	1.7	4.5	2.1	1.9
Overall Social Cohesion	6.8	6.3	5.5	5.5	6.9	6.2

The composite score is measured on a scale of 0-10, with 0 indicating a very poor level of social cohesion, and 10 denoting the highest level of societal cohesiveness. In general, strong social cohesion trends are represented by scores of 8 and above. In South Sudan social cohesion in each of the 5 regions is medium low with Bentiu and Yambio scoring lowest with 5.5, while the other regions did not score above 7. The different SCORE components show positive trends for intergenerational cohesion, peaceful citizenship, and inclusive civic identity. On the other hand, inter-group harmony⁹ and community cooperation are low. The low values for these indicators help pull down the overall quality of social cohesion, and policy options for strengthening social cohesion will benefit from direct investments in these two areas.

Readiness for violence is an inverse metric, so a low score for this variable denotes a positive contribution to the overall state of social cohesion. Globally, it is expected that the average propensity of readiness for violence will score 1, with the goal of pushing this value down as far as possible. A score of 1 is equivalent to 10 percent of people in society who exhibit violent tendencies (violent citizenship). The average readiness for violence SCORE across all 5 regions is 1.9, and while the violence tendency metric in Aweil and Bor is relatively low, the scores in Rumbek (2.1), Yambio (1.7) and Bentiu (4.5) are high. While these three regions should be the target for improving peaceful citizenship, the situation in Bentiu requires specific attention.


Readiness for violence and peaceful citizenship

Establishing a durable sustaining peace agenda in South Sudan will depend on strengthening local capacities for peaceful citizenship. SCORE uses the **peaceful citizenship indicator** to measure people's tendency to choose peaceful means over violent

⁹ The intergroup harmony score to outgroups is derived by calculating the composite value of individual respondents' worse perceptions (least trust and least positive feelings) of another ethnic group in that specific region.

responses to conflict-related situations, even when violence is used by others. This contrasts with the **readiness for violence** indicator which helps us to understand the threshold for use of violence to resolve problems both in public and private domains.

Figure 5: Regional comparison between readiness for violence and peaceful citizenship



The comparison between these peaceful citizenship and readiness for violence (figure 5) focuses attention on regional differences, with Bentiu, Yambio and Rumbek showing the highest levels of violent tendency. On the other hand, peaceful citizenship is strongest in Bor, Yambio and Rumbek. The five-region average for readiness for violence is 1.9 and for peaceful citizenship is 7.2. Violence readiness was calculated on the basis of how people would respond if their community was repeatedly attacked by a neighbouring community (figure 6), with Bentiu and Rumbek scoring higher than the 5-region average.

Figure 6: To what extent is it acceptable to do the following against a community or tribe that is hostile to your community and has attacked it on numerous occasions?

Five-region average responses	Definitely Acceptable	Possibly Acceptable	Not Acceptable
Attack their community in revenge	9%	9%	78%
Defend our community from future attacks	31%	39%	26%
Engage in dialogue to overcome the hostility	61%	27%	7%
Build ties of peace through inter-marriage and trade, to overcome the hostility	56%	32%	8%
Ask the government to take action to stop the attacks	67%	23%	6%

Although the five-region trend is to find peaceful ways to resolve conflict, regional differences demonstrate the potential for violent responses by citizens; a phenomenon affirmed by recent UN assessments of the situation in the country. For example the Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council of 15 June 2020 notes: "While the permanent ceasefire largely continued to hold, the security situation deteriorated as disagreement over gubernatorial positions and the ensuing lack of authority at the State level compounded tensions and exacerbated communal violence and crime".¹⁰

Understanding the spectrum of citizenship responses to conflict

SCORE assessed potential citizen responses to conflict situations along a spectrum from those who are most likely to use violence to those who are most likely to use peaceful means. This was done by independently measuring possible violent and peaceful responses, leading to the clustering of citizens' responses into four groups (Figure 7 below). Sixty-nine percent of people fall into the group which show high levels of peaceful citizenship qualities and a low potential to use violence, implying that they are most likely to use peaceful means for addressing conflict situations in daily life. Three percent of citizens are most likely to fully reject peaceful means for responding to conflict and show a high score for violence readiness. Fifteen percent of people are as likely to use peaceful methods to resolve conflict as they are to resort to violence. It is likely that people in this group will choose whether to exercise violence or peaceful methods, such as dialogue, depending on the circumstances and context of the conflict situation. Creating the right kind of socio-political environment which encourages people in this group to favour peaceful conflict resolution approaches is a crucial policy entry point for a wider sustaining peace agenda. Finally, 13 percent of respondents scored low on both peaceful citizenship and violence readiness, constituting a group which is most likely to remain passive in the face of conflict. Citizens in this group are likely to avoid engagement with a conflict situation and are least likely to participate in collective action – either violence or peaceful – to resolve conflicts affecting the wider community.

SCORE understands that these citizen responses exist on a fluid spectrum and the grouping of respondents is not intended to dogmatically classify people as a particular kind of citizen. SCORE results reveal that among those individuals who are as likely to use violence as peaceful methods, the majority emphasized peaceful ways for resolving conflict, confirming the premise that given the right kind of socio-political environment, people in this group will prefer dialogue over fighting.

¹⁰ Report of the Secretary-General, Situation in South Sudan, 15 June 2020, S/2020/536

Figure 7: Snapshot of most likely responses to conflict





Figure 8 below shows that the proportion of citizens who gravitate towards a particular kind of conflict response differs in each region. Aweil and Bor are dominated by large majorities of citizens with peaceful orientation, and overall, there is a solid rejection of violence, although 24 percent of Aweil citizens prefer avoidance in the face of conflict (passive response). On the other hand, a large part of the citizenry in Yambio and Rumbek have a peaceful orientation but there is a considerable group (19 percent and 24 percent respectively) of people who are as likely to use violence as peaceful methods.


In Bentiu a much larger portion of citizens (38 percent) are likely to use both violence and peaceful methods, while a sizable minority (19 percent) are most likely to immediately respond violently. Regression models help explain the drivers for the different kinds of response to conflict from different groups of citizens. The models help identify the factors which predict the likely response someone will exercise when confronted with a conflict situation. More significantly, this predictive analysis helps identify the conditions for reducing the propensity for people to immediately resort to violence, while pinpointing specific policy and programme choices which will create the conditions which encourage citizens to reach for peaceful citizenship behaviours.

Figure 8: Citizens' likely response to conflict by region




Figures 9-11 translates SCORE findings into a predictive model showing the positive and negative drivers for peaceful citizenship and for violence readiness. Blue arrows denote a positive driver which increases the outcome and red arrows denote a negative driver which undermines the outcome. All drivers are significant, but the strength of the impact varies, with the drivers ranked from strongest to weakest, allowing for prioritization of factors which impact peacefulness and violence.

Figure 9: Factors predicting peaceful citizenship




Behaviours and attitudes predicting peaceful citizenship cluster around a set of qualities which combine dispositional skills such as prosocial orientation, attitudes such as tolerance for other ethnic groups, and behaviours such as a willingness to participate in civic life. Willingness to participate in civic life is the strongest predictor of peaceful citizenship and offers a very tangible policy route towards constructive civic engagement. Similarly, the rule of law (civic adherence) is a strong asset and underpins several aspects of social cohesion in driving peaceful citizenship and support for the peace process, while also being associated with the desire of people to see civilian disarmament. Prosocial orientation (a sense of personal responsibility rather than a desire for personal gain) is another significant driver for peaceful citizenship and points to the need for actions and policies which celebrate volunteerism that benefits the community as a whole and promotes empathy and moral values.

Figure 10: Factors undermining peaceful citizenship



The fact that distance from a school undermines peaceful citizenship indicates that a school environment creates social relations which promotes collaborative relations between individuals and groups. Schools and a school environment can be profound outlets for civic engagement activities and nurturing prosocial attitudes. Since SCORE did not find that educational status acted as a driver of peacefulness, the lesson is that access to a school environment is sufficient to create the social relations which generate peaceful cooperation between individuals and groups. Other elements which dilute the penchant for a peaceful mindset are negative individual behaviours – being callous and being impulsive – while having a high regard for the military.

Figure 11: Factors predicting readiness for violence



Results show that the strongest driver of readiness for violence is exposure to economic shocks. The SCORE analysis indicates that people who are most likely to resort to violence and people who are equally disposed to violent and non-violent responses report the highest levels of conflict exposure and experienced the most severe shocks to their livelihoods through destroyed crops and livestock and natural events such as drought and floods. The level of life traumas experienced by this group, which constitutes 18 percent of respondents, is significantly higher than people who are most likely to use peaceful means to resolve conflict or those who will choose to be passive. The propensity to use violence among this group provides the strongest evidence that destitution and underdevelopment can contribute to citizens' decision to use violence in daily life, while a policy response to reducing violence must emphasize the delivery of peace dividends which bring tangible social and economic benefits to people.

The positive impact of material wellbeing and quality of life on citizens' peaceful orientation (69 percent of respondents are most likely to use peaceful methods for resolving conflict) cannot be underestimated. "Peaceful citizens" were found to have a higher level of Household Dietary Diversity and the lowest level of average members of the household who are unemployed (1 person on average). On the other hand, people who are most likely to be violent live in households with an average of 7 unemployed family members. People who are as likely to be violent as to be peaceful live in households with an average of 3 unemployed family members. This implies a direct correlation between fulfilling basic needs and creating an environment where the peaceful resolution of conflict can prosper, while larger households potentially accentuate the resource deficits that make meeting these basic needs more challenging. This data underwrites the causal relationship between poverty and unemployment and conflict in South Sudan, where competition for resources places incredible strain on the family unit and wider community.

Civic Engagement and the willingness to participate in civic life are also drivers for violence readiness. SCORE shows that active civic engagement is strongest among the 15 percent of citizens who are as likely to use violence to resolve conflict as they are to use peaceful methods. This group has the highest levels of active participation in civic and communal affairs and are more likely than fully peaceful citizens to participate in civic life. This is consistent with the premise that the most active citizens have the potential to be constructive – build their communities, or destructive – to act violently. It highlights how violence in South Sudan *may often* come about because citizens who want to solve communal problems do not have the option of using peaceful vehicles to navigate conflictive situations. It confronts policymakers with the responsibility to channel citizenship constructively, demanding effective and trusted conflict resolution mechanisms which allow people to express their concerns and fight for their interests through institutions, laws, procedures and norms which satisfies a legitimate and predictable system of good governance.

A key dimension of constructive civic engagement is the value of reconciliation as a currency in the process of restoring social cohesion. In SCORE the indicator for vindictiveness was used as a measure to assess the capacity of citizens to forgive past wrongs, as opposed to seeking vengeance. Vindictiveness (the inability to forgive) was found to be a driver of violence, demonstrating the need to support investments in healing and reconciliation as a strategy for reducing violent tendencies. This is discussed in more detail in Section D on Infrastructures for Peace.

Strengthening capacities for peaceful citizenship

Peaceful citizenship is strongly associated with constructive citizenship traits and behaviours. Figure 12 presents key peace-related indicators which were found to have a statistically significant association with peaceful citizenship. They are not considered drivers of peaceful citizenship, but they have a strong association with the peaceful citizenship outcome. This cluster of behaviours and attitudes reinforce the overall policy framework for fostering social peace through active and engaged citizenship. The proposition for investing more into active citizens as a strategy for peace consolidation is emphasized by the fact that passive citizenship is a negative correlate of peaceful citizenship.

Figure 12: Important correlates of peaceful citizenship

Description of Indicator	Strength of association
Support for R-ARCSS	0.39
Support for increasing role of the chief	0.34
Active Citizenship Orientation	0.32
Support for reducing guns	0.31
Callousness	-0.35
Passive Citizenship Orientation	-0.34

A value of +0.2 or above denotes a very strong significant relationship. The inverse value (-0.2 and higher) denotes a strong negative relationship.

SCORE findings make a critical connection between peaceful citizenship and support for the peace process (See Section B). In this regard, peaceful citizenship needs to be seen as the most important currency for implementing R-ARCSS, with a clear policy goal for developing peaceful citizenship capacities in preparation for the country’s first post-war general elections. There is cause for hope, given that only 3 percent of South Sudanese seem *most likely* to use violence when faced with conflict-related challenges. However, there is a clear need to address the concerns of this group who demonstrate a readiness for violence. Notable is the finding that people which disagree with or express reservations about the peace agreement and gun reduction demonstrate a stronger inclination to use violence. The finding identifies groups in society which need convincing that these key policies on political change and disarmament are beneficial and will not undermine their interests or security.

The virtuous cycle of peaceful citizenship-support for the peace agreement and *constructive civic engagement* forms a strong basis for peace consolidation investments. The constellation of civic and political assets strongly associated with peaceful citizenship includes increasing the role of the Chief, implying that peaceful citizenship is aligned with the constructive leadership role of respected local leaders. The Chiefs in all 5 regions unanimously agree that South Sudan’s politicians must work to implement the peace agreement. SCORE shows that the role, authority and personality of the Chief influence communities’ approach to the peace process and peaceful citizenship. In bomas where the Chief has good negotiation skills, the community tends to be more peaceful. This finding carries an important message for the future role of chiefs. In this case Chiefs should be more than bureaucratic extensions of state management of resources, but serve as grass-roots leaders who can, if allowed to act in a non-partisan way, convince the community to turn towards peaceful citizenship.

Inclusive civic identity

Home to over 60 ethnic groups South Sudan has a diverse socio-demographic landscape. SCORE explores the phenomenon of multiple identities through the lens of inclusive civic identity. It shows that 52% of people self-identify as equally South Sudanese and their own ethnic group, meaning that just over half the respondents in the study feel comfortable with a common national culture and a sense of shared inheritance which in theory transcends ethnic differences. It is an attitude to identity which is not bound to one specific form of attachment but relies on acknowledging unifying elements across different ethnicities.

Figure 13: Inclusive civic identity scores by region


	Aweil	Bor	Yambio	Bentiu	Rumbek
Regional Score	8.1	7.4	6.7	6.9	7.7
Urban	8.1	7.5	7.2	6.9	7.7
Rural	8.1	7.3	6.2	6.8*	7.8
Male	8.1	7.4	6.7	6.7	7.7
Female	8.2	7.3	6.6	7.1	7.7

Note for figure 13 above: Inclusive civic identity measures the extent to which people believe that the different ethnic groups of South Sudan share an overarching culture and way of life, with more things uniting rather than separating them. Scores closer to 10 denote stronger inclusive civic identity.

* Due to Covid-19, sampling in Bentiu was not completed resulting in only 1 Rural Boma being surveyed.

People in Aweil (8.1) expressed the highest level of inclusive civic identity compared to the national average (7.4). Lower inclusive civic identity scores are calculated for Yambio (6.7) and Bentiu (6.9), contributing to these two regions' low social cohesion score overall. In both regions a sizeable portion of respondents do not believe in an overarching identity and culture which unifies South Sudan's various ethnic groups. In Bentiu, 54% of people feel closer to their ethnic group than a national identity whereas this is 28% in Yambio. In these two regions, where the Dinka group did not make up the majority of the sample frame, there is a split between people from the same ethnic group who are on one hand comfortable with a South Sudanese identity, and those who emphasize their own ethnic affiliation. Addressing this divergence within the same ethnic community is essential to help nurture the formation of inclusive civic identities which promotes multiculturalism. Reconciling this issue of identity is critical from the perspective of inter group and intra group relations and serves as a platform for accepting diversity and understanding the cultures and histories of other ethnic groups.

Figure 14: Mapping identities by region



Promoting inclusive civic identities is important as SCORE shows that people who believe in the similarities across ethnic groups have higher trust in and positive feelings towards other ethnic groups. At the same time people with an inclusive civic identity are more likely to show higher support for the peace process. There is also a positive relationship between an inclusive civic identity and hope in the peace process, peaceful citizenship, and community cooperation. Promoting commonalities across the different ethnicities which supports a multi-ethnic identity would enhance a more peaceful and inclusive social and political mindset.

Intergroup harmony

Figure 15 shows the value of inter-group harmony per region from 0-10, with 10 denoting the strongest level of inter-group harmony. In each case the value is a composite SCORE of trust and positive feelings towards each ethnic group in the left column, as reported by the community in that region. For example, in Yambio there is a strong level of trust towards Zandes, Morus, Balandas Bakas, but not towards Dinkas or Nuers.

Figure 15: Intergroup harmony across regions

Intergroup Harmony with...	Aweil	Bor	Yambio	Bentiu	Rumbek
Dinkas	7.8	8.7	2.1	4.4	8.5
Nuers	5.0	3.8	2.7	7.5	2.2
Murles		2.4			
Anyuaks		6.7			
Falatas	5.7				
Jur Chuols	6.3				
Zandes			9.6	4.4	3.2
Morus			7.5		
Balandas			7.4		
Bakas			7.9		
Shilluks				4.2	
Jur Bels					6.2
Bongos					3.0

Overall intergroup harmony across the five regions is low, and this poor score contributes significantly to low social cohesion. As would be expected Dinka majority areas (Aweil, Bor and Rumbek) demonstrate a high level of intergroup harmony towards the Dinka group. In this context the level of poor inter group relations seems contextualised rather than a consistent five-region pattern. For example, intergroup harmony between Dinkas and Nuers is better in Aweil (5) than it is in Bor (3.8) and Rumbek (2.2). On the other hand, the Nuer majority community in Bentiu feel equally harmonious towards Dinkas (4.4), as they do to other groups (Zandes and Shilluks). In Yambio, the community reports a poor level of


harmony with both Nuers (2.7) and Dinkas (2.1). The politics of the Nuer – Dinka relationship evidently has its own dynamic at the local level. Yambio shows the greatest levels of mistrust and negative feelings towards both the Dinka and Nuer groups, while the Dinka – Muerle relationship in Bor is one of the most fractious in the SCORE assessment.

Box 1: Comparing intergroup relations in South Sudan and other SCORE countries

South Sudan’s level of intergroup harmony is poor compared to similar SCORE assessments in other countries. Two key SCORE indicators can be compared across countries a) trust and b) positive feelings towards ethnic outgroups. In South Sudan 65% of respondents reported total mistrust of ethnic outgroups, while the equivalent proportion was 27% in Liberia and 32% in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The scores for positive feelings towards outgroups was 2.5 in South Sudan, 7.7 in Ivory Coast and 5.0 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. South Sudan’s low scores seem to underwrite the ethnicisation of the national political conflict combined with the intensity of community conflicts.

Figure 16 shows how fostering intergroup harmony can be achieved through a peaceful citizenship mentality, which promotes non-violent means to overcome inter-group hostilities. This means focussing on the elements that drive peaceful citizenship as entry points for building trust between rival ethnic groups, and which gravitate around constructive civic engagement strategies including dialogue and reducing cultural distance.

Figure 16: Drivers of intergroup harmony




Blue arrows denote a positive driver for intergroup harmony and red arrows denote a driver which undermines intergroup harmony. All drivers are significant, but the thickness of the arrow denotes the relative strength of the predictive relationship.

Cultural distance towards outgroups (the extent to which people feel their own culture is dissimilar to the culture of another ethnic group) forms the main barrier to intergroup harmony. Figure 17 shows how on a scale of 0-10, levels of cultural distance are high across

the five regions (6.9) with the worse score in Rumbek (9.0) followed by Bor (7.4). On the other hand, acknowledging the cultural similarities across the various ethnicities drives a harmonious attitude. This could be achieved by promoting cultural similarities and teaching history through a multi-dimensional perspective. Support for traditional male gender roles also undermines intergroup trust, and this could be linked to “toxic masculinity” which serves as a break on skills required to accept responsibility for failing to pursue non-violent methods for conflict resolution. In this regard peaceful citizenship traits, which are positively associated with intergroup harmony, are possibly dismissed as a feminine characteristic which are not consistent with traditional male role models.

Figure 17: Reducing cultural distance is a priority for improving intergroup harmony



Cultural distance on a scale of 0-10, where 10 denotes the worse level of cultural distance.

SCORE findings show that intra-group tensions are also prevalent in some regions. A deeper anthropological analysis, which is beyond the scope of this study, would help identify the sources of tension between different sub-groups within specific ethnic groups and it is fair to speculate some of these age-old enmities have been exacerbated by national and sub-national political conflicts. Figure 18 shows that Aweil, Bentiu and Rumbek are characterized by notable intra-group tensions where members of the same ethnicity report cold or hostile feelings towards each other. The Experts report on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2428 (2018) sheds some light on why the level of intra-group tensions are particularly high in Bentiu¹¹.

¹¹ Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2428 (2018), S/2019/301

Figure 18: Intra-group tensions across the five regions

Region	Dominant group sampled	% of people expressing hostile feelings to their own ethnic group
Aweil	Dinka	15%
Bentiu	Nuer	45%
Bor	Dinka	2.5%
Rumbek	Dinka	16%
Yambio	Zande	2%

Box 2: Intergroup harmony in Rumbek

Intergroup harmony in Rumbek is especially low (1.7), given the homogeneous character of this predominantly Dinka town; 98 percent of the SCORE respondents belonged to the Dinka ethnic group. SCORE measures intergroup harmony through two indicators: trust of other ethnic groups and positive feelings towards other ethnic groups. The main factors undermining intergroup harmony are high levels of anxiety, cultural distance and readiness for violence. There are a few factors which are unique to Rumbek, helping to explain the low intergroup harmony score. First, Rumbek has a significantly high proportion of people who are as likely to use violence as peaceful means to resolve conflict (24 percent). Second, of the five regions, people in Rumbek feel the most culturally distant (9 out of 10) from other ethnic groups and score high on anxiety. Since only 11 percent of people feel more South Sudanese than their ethnic group, it is possible that the Rumbek version of a South Sudanese identity is predominantly synonymous with the Dinka ethnicity. This implies that although 56 per of people self-identify as equally South Sudanese and their own ethnic group, this version of South Sudanese identity excludes other ethnicities. Therefore, mono-communal education in the Dinka community which highlights the cultural similarities across ethnic groups could better promote an inclusive national identity. Psychological support for those suffering from anxiety and violent tendency (who may be experiencing post-conflict trauma) will also serve as an important precondition for improving Rumbek citizens' overall appreciation and acceptance of other ethnic groups.

Intergenerational cohesion

Intergenerational cohesion describes the harmonious collaboration between people of different ages. The indicator also considers the inclusion of younger people in decision-making, and the guidance-seeking behaviour of young people from people older than them.

Figure 19: Intergenerational cohesion in South Sudan

	Bor	Rumbek	Aweil	Bentiu	Yambio
Inter-Generational Cohesion	8.8	8.6	8.4	7.5	5.5

Intergenerational cohesion is reasonably high in all regions and there is little consistent discrepancy between rural and urban areas. Results show that Yambio has a weaker set of inter-generational relationship capacities than other regions, suggesting that this is one area for specific attention. Chiefs report that intergenerational tensions are a cause of conflict to varying degrees, which is reaffirmed in Yambio as a major concern. Yambio's lower score in intergenerational cohesion is linked to the weaker perceptions that younger people and older people cooperate and interact constrictively. Citizens in Aweil, Bor and Rumbek strongly agree that older and younger people collaborate harmoniously, show respect for each other, and make decisions together. On the other hand, people in Yambio are far more negative about these relationships, with 15 percent disagreeing (combined percentage of people who strongly disagree and somewhat disagree) with the proposition that intergenerational relations are collaborative, compared with an average of 3 percent of people who thought the same in the other four regions.

SCORE results infer that younger people are at the forefront of the most important ideological shifts in the country, while also providing a guide to local trends. For example, while people under 40 score highly for gender equality mindset and demonstrate a higher level of trust towards outgroups, in the regions with the worse social cohesion scores (Yambio and Bentiu) it's this age group which perceive the most acute cultural difference between ethnic groups and mistrust outgroups. This finding affirms the role of youth in translating cultural distance into inter-group tensions, and when this happens it is more likely to result in violence. In the three regions where readiness for violence is highest – Bentiu, Rumbek and Yambio – people under 40 show higher violent tendencies.

In general support for the peace agreement across the five regions is higher than awareness of the agreement's contents; however younger people are more inclined to have better knowledge of the peace agreement. Although overall support for R-ARCSS is high, younger people are not more supportive of the peace agreement than older people. However, given young people's greater understanding of the peace agreement, efforts to make South Sudanese youth advocates of the peace process could be a prescient move to empowering them as champions of peaceful change in their communities.

Figure 20: Intergenerational awareness of and support for of the peace agreement

	Five region average		Yambio		Bor		Aweil		Bentiu		Rumbek	
	Under 39	Over 40	Under 39	Over 40	Under 39	Over 40	Under 39	Over 40	Under 39	Over 40	Under 39	Over 40
Awareness of R-ARCSS	6.2	5.6	6.6	6.7	6.3	5.7	6.0	4.4	5.4	5.7	6.3	5.3
Support for R-ARCSS	8.4	8.5	9.3	9.0	8.3	8.4	8.9	8.7	5.8	6.9	7.8	8.8

Community cooperation

The final component used to assess the strength of the social cohesion was community cooperation, which measured the quality of intra-group relationships. Community cooperation quantifies the level of cooperation in daily life between households to achieve common livelihoods goals. It quantifies how often households produce agricultural goods together, engage in commerce together, and cooperate to find water.

Figure 21: Community cooperation scores by region

		Aweil	Bor	Yambio	Bentiu	Rumbek
Regional Score		4.0	2.8	3.4	3.7	7.1
	Urban	3.7	2.9	3.6	3.8	7.1
	Rural	4.5	2.7	3.2	4.4*	7.1
	Male	3.9	2.9	3.6	3.7	7.2
	Female	4.1	2.7	3.2	3.7	7.1

Community cooperation on a scale of 0-10, where 10 denotes the highest level of cooperation.

* Due to Covid-19, sampling in Bentiu was not completed resulting in only 1 Rural Boma being surveyed.

Community cooperation is an important civic asset since it correlates significantly with civic engagement, inclusive collaboration, inclusive civic identity and peaceful citizenship (figure 22). Each of these elements are fundamental to building the basis for social cohesion at the local level and developing local capacities for peace consolidation, even if the activity of collaboration is not directly related to peacebuilding outcomes. This implies that to build up collaborative livelihood strategies among communities, collaboration skills and a common umbrella identity is helpful, and can strengthen peaceful citizenship.

In another example of the influence of the Chief in his/her respective community, strong community cooperation assets are associated with the Chief’s capacities (e.g. financial resources, training in legal theory). This affirms the instrumental role of the Chief in guiding the community, and implies that better resourced and knowledgeable local chiefs will greatly assist community development, since many of the community cooperation dimensions relate to local economic activity.

Figure 22: Indicators associated with community cooperation

Civic engagement	0.35
Chief’s capacities to be more effective	0.28
Peaceful citizenship	0.26
Inclusive collaboration	0.22
Inclusive civic identity	0.20

A value of +0.2 or above denotes a very strong significant relationship.

Although scores indicate that overall community cooperation is not high across the five regions certain activities such as collaborating to take goods to market (53 percent of people do this), producing agricultural goods together (56 percent of people do this) and identifying water (69 percent of people do this) is not uncommon. Of the five regions Rumbek and Aweil show the greatest community cooperation capacities, and these are also the regions with the highest overall social cohesion scores.

SECTION A: POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Invest in civic engagement activities to strengthen peaceful citizenship

A cluster of citizenship qualities predict peaceful citizenship among people, including willingness to participate in civic life, prosocial orientation, civic adherence and inter-group harmony. On the other hand, passive citizenship undermines peaceful citizenship. Local public awareness campaigns which celebrate peaceful and constructive citizenship would greatly support an overall policy goal of building local capacities for conflict prevention and management, while encouraging active citizenship. It is important to ensure that these programmes and policies are underpinned by livelihoods programmes which demonstrate a peace dividend. Vocational training should include citizenship modules which emphasize the importance of prosocial orientation, civic adherence and dialogue.

Establish school-like environments which promote constructive citizenship values

Expanding children's access to school environments will help to develop this citizenship value from an early age. Poor access to schools is the main driver undermining peaceful citizenship. SCORE shows that it is the school environment rather than educational attainment which strengthens peaceful citizenship. Making these school-like environments easy to access need to be a priority for communities seeking to strengthen their peaceful citizenship and civic capacities. Informal structures for learning should be established in areas where formal schools are unavailable, and community leaders and parents should commit their time to teaching children about constructive civic values. International donors should support this process, where local authorities' resources are scarce.

Strengthen the capacity for peaceful dialogue

The overall trend shows that peaceful citizenship is a stronger dynamic than readiness for violence. High readiness for violence scores can be explained by specific local circumstances, which have historic roots and are aggravated by divisive political dynamics. The dominant trend towards dialogue needs to be consolidated as the primary currency for strengthening peaceful citizenship. The challenge is whether the skills and knowledge are available at the local level to manage dialogue as an effective conflict prevention and dispute resolution tool. The Chiefs in all the regions report that the resources available for the local peace committees are inadequate. Investing in local infrastructures for peace must be a priority and should include conflict resolution and conflict management training, which should include building negotiation skills among chiefs since this quality is associated with lower levels of violent attitudes in the respective Chiefs' community. Apart from recognized community leaders, this training should be expanded to people with professional skills (business and medicine), which SCORE identifies as champions of peaceful citizenship. Creating a cadre of local

professional peace champions will ensure the responsibility for consolidating peace does not solely lie with the Chief.

Establish mono-communal spaces where people can learn about other cultures and develop capacities for constructive inter-ethnic relations

A major obstacle to social cohesion is cultural distance which directly impacts harmonious inter-group relations. In some cases, fractious relations between subgroups of a particular tribe helps to undermine social cohesion. On the other hand, SCORE shows that there are divergences within ethnic groups between those who support an inclusive civic identity and those who only want to embrace their own ethnic identity above all others. These findings point to the need for each ethnic group to internalise tolerance, empathy and understanding towards other ethnic groups. This should be done through mono-communal education and facilitated dialogue between members of the same ethnic group which allows people to examine their attitudes to other groups which are considered hostile or the enemy, while also building a strong inclusive identity which can transcend ethnic divisions. The approach could explore common traits shared by different ethnic groups with a view to identifying similarities which transcend ethnic difference.

Empower youth to be community peace and development ambassadors

SCORE assessed inter-generational harmony as a component of social cohesion due to the fact that 70% of the country's population are aged under thirty. Youth are the most affected by the war and represent a high proportion of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs). Results show that inter-generational relations remain positive, and this is indeed one of the key factors in sustaining social cohesion at the local level. Yambio has a weaker set of inter-generational relationship capacities than other regions, and in this regard the region's Partnership for Resilience and Recovery Programme is an example for other parts of the country. The 11-Point Agenda for Yambio emphasizes the role of youth in development programmes and establishes the space for youth in community decision-making. SCORE also shows that younger people (under 40 years) are generally more aware of the contents of the peace agreement. This understanding and the high level of support for R-ARCSS among younger people should be harnessed. Young people's role in community development and local decision-making needs to be combined with an advocacy and educational mandate to sustain support for the peace agreement and the peace process.

Invest in community cooperation projects which connect different ethnic groups and demonstrates an inclusive peace dividend

Community cooperation is an important civic asset which is strongly associated with peaceful citizenship and other constructive citizenship traits such as civic engagement, inclusive collaboration and inclusive civic identity. This provides an entry point for development projects and policies which can create spaces for rival

communities to cooperate and demonstrate a mutual peace dividend. Targetted investments into projects which mobilise communities around concrete economic and cultural benefits should be prioritised. These projects should be highly participative and provide decision-making mechanisms that ensure community ownership of process and results. SCORE identified a positive correlation between business in marketplaces and intergroup harmony. Inter-communal projects to improve marketplace facilities could help establish venues for inclusive local economic development and growth. These “Smart” marketplaces could use mini-grid technology to modernise market infrastructures that integrate safe and climate-controlled food storage facilities which help reduce post-harvest loss and increase incomes for growers and sellers.

SECTION B: SUPPORT FOR THE REVITALISED AGREEMENT ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN SOUTH SUDAN

Despite the delays in advancing the official peace process popular support for a political solution to the country’s civil war remains strong among the majority of people. SCORE assessed different aspects of the peace agreement during the second extension period (which started in November 2019) in Aweil, Bor and Yambio, and in Bentiu and Rumbek after the formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity in February 2020. Questions were intended to understand how amenable people were to parts of the agreement which would have a direct impact on people’s lives or would potentially conflict with people’s ideological worldview.

Figure 23: Most people want R-ARCSS to succeed


Components of the peace agreement tested for the South Sudan SCORE	Somewhat + Totally Disagree	Don't Know	Somewhat Agree	Totally Agree
People who fled my community during the war are welcome to return to their original homes.	5.6%	0.7%	15%	79%
Everyone must observe the permanent ceasefire.	3.9%	1.5%	18%	77%
The Government of South Sudan must treat all tribes equally.	5.9%	0.4%	17%	77%
Only peaceful means must be used to resolve future political and inter-ethnic disputes in South Sudan.	7.8%	0.6%	23%	69%
I am prepared to accept the results of the next national elections, even if it means my political party loses.	7.5%	2.0%	21%	67%
Our politicians must work to implement the peace agreement for South Sudan.	6.9%	0.1%	27%	66%
The Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing must investigate all acts of violence against civilians committed during the civil war.	6.8%	0.5%	27%	66%

SCORE assessed support for R-ARCSS by asking respondents seven questions relating to both the letter and the spirit of the peace agreement (figure 23 above). Although there is overall strong support for the agreement across the five regions surveyed, the focus here is to look at the group who “somewhat agree” with these elements of the agreement. Given the acceptance of the R-ARCSS elements by most respondents, people who require more convincing need to be understood to ensure the peace process can remain resilient in the face of socio-political and economic pressures which could potentially undermine the agreement’s credibility. In this regard there is a discernible level of dissent among certain

groups which either disagree with R-ARCSS (a small minority) or who are not fully convinced and express some misgivings about the agreement (a larger and not to be ignored minority).

Figure 24 delineates responses to the seven different dimensions of the peace agreement selected for the SCORE analysis, with respondents assigned scores from 0 to 10 depending on their level of agreement. Scores between 0-4.9 indicate complete rejection of all 7 elements and is attributed to 6 percent of respondents. Scores between 5-7.9 denote varying levels of disagreement with different peace agreement dimensions and is attributed to 31 percent of respondents; these are people who partially accept the peace agreement and who need more convincing. Scores of 8-10 denotes the highest level of acceptance of all elements of the peace agreement tested in the SCORE survey, with 63 percent of respondents strongly supporting the agreement, with 34 percent fully supporting all elements.

Figure 24: Strength of support for R-ARCSS



Safeguarding the peace agreement

The history of peace agreements worldwide demonstrates their vulnerability and the fragility of the political consensus on which they depend. Research shows that more than 50 percent of peace agreements fail within five years of signature¹². In part, this is because negotiations and accords often do not address the underlying causes of conflict, while the process often lacks legitimacy among citizens. Critically, not enough is done to bring all sectors of society, including spoilers, into the process. The SCORE results identify certain constituencies who are possibly ready to abandon the peace process. The opportunity exists to develop strategies which can shore up this “fragile” support and make the agreement resilient to dissenting forces.

The highest concentration of people who are not fully convinced by the peace agreement is in Bentiu (71 percent), followed by Bor (46 percent), Rumbek (36 percent), Aweil (30 percent), and Yambio (18 percent). Bentiu and Bor show the greatest level of dissent to R-ARCSS,

¹² Across Conflict Lines: Women Mediating for Peace 12th Annual Colloquium Findings, January 9 to 21, 2011, Institute for Inclusive Security

requiring exploration into why the peace process appears to be failing to inspire trust among communities in these regions.

Figure 25: Comparing levels of support for R-ARCSS with faith in the peace process

	Yambio	Aweil	Bor	Rumbek	Bentiu
Level of support for R-ARCSS out of 10	9.2	8.8	8.3	8.1	6.1
Percentage of people who fully agree that the peace process will benefit their community	76%	81%	76%	80%	40%

Regional comparisons show that support for the peace process and the local community’s belief in peace dividends are strongly correlated. While on average 78 percent of people from Yambio, Aweil, Bor and Rumbek are strongly confident (fully agree) the peace process will benefit their community, only 40 percent of people in Bentiu feel the same (although 44% of people in Bentiu somewhat agree benefits will come to their community). Of concern is the absence of unambiguous support in Bentiu for key elements of the peace agreement. In particular only 36 percent of people totally agree that peaceful means should be used to resolve inter-ethnic disputes, while only 39% of people totally agree to accept the results of the next elections even if their preferred political party loses. Low levels of support for the peace agreement and skepticism about the peace agreement’s benefits are acute in Bentiu. When assessed through the lens of Nuer mistrust of the Dinka and the contested political leadership dynamics in the Nuer community, this situation should be a cause of concern with regards to the successful implementation of the peace agreement in Unity state.

Using the SCORE methodology, it is possible to identify the factors which best predict positive or negative attitudes towards the peace agreement. These predictors help identify the motivations and the drivers of support for the peace agreement (or lack thereof), and can be categorized as: individual level skills, individual attitudes and contextual factors. Individual skills and attitudes collectively constitute citizenship qualities, which help determine citizenship choices in a given situation. Figure 26 and figure 27 demonstrate the contrasting drivers which increase and decrease support for the peace agreement. By using predictive modelling (linear regressions), SCORE shows that hope in the peace process, and the belief it will bring benefits to people is the strongest driver for R-ARCSS. This is helped by a belief in the rule of law and support for a strong South Sudanese identity which transcends ethnic differences (inclusive civic identity). People who embrace these philosophies are most likely to support R-ARCSS. Other factors strongly associated with support for the peace process include a belief in gender equality and a higher food consumption score.

Figure 26: Factors which are drivers for people to support the peace process

Individual skills	Individual attitudes	Contextual factors
Civic adherence	Hope in the peace process	High food consumption score
Prosocial orientation	Inclusive civic identity	Inter-generational harmony
Inclusive collaboration	Gender equality mindset	Households where there is a family member who is a student
Business planning skills and growth mindset	Increase the role of the Chief	

On the other hand, there are specific drivers which weaken support for the peace agreement, and these are the issues which require attention to ensure the peace process does not falter at the political or societal level. The cluster of factors which decrease support for R-ARCSS can possibly be seen through the lens of particular interest groups in society. These are people who have a higher income and strong ties to cattle herding and may have narrow politico-ethnic based interests (political tribalism). In combination with some individual traits which imply a preference to pursue self-interest over the common social good (callousness), this points to a group which perceives the peace agreement and its provisions as potentially threatening their privileges, and established power structures.

Figure 27: Factors which decrease support for R-ARCSS


Individual skills	Individual attitudes	Contextual factors
Callousness	Support for stronger local autonomy	Higher income
		Households where there is a family members who herds cattle
		Political tribalism

Regional priorities for peace consolidation

Aggregate results from the five regions help to provide the big picture of how citizens are engaging with the peace process. In addition, SCORE assesses the regional differences and identifies localised positive and negative drivers for supporting R-ARCSS. This approach can help develop region-specific priorities for strengthening support for the peace agreement. Customising peace consolidation strategies in this way can help to leverage a more effective response to the challenges of safeguarding the peace process. Figures 28 to 35 translate SCORE findings into predictive models showing the positive and negative drivers for supporting the peace process in each region. Blue arrows denote a positive driver for R-

ARCSS and red arrows denote a driver which undermines support. All drivers are significant, but the thickness of the arrow denotes the relative strength of the predictive relationship.

Figure 28: positive drivers of R-ARCSS in AWEIL



Communities in Aweil are focussed on the rule of law and civic engagement. These are the civic traits which drive support for the peace process. Being spared the worst excesses of violence which afflicted other regions, Aweil is fully invested in the peace process, with over 80% of people believing R-ARCSS will bring benefits to their community. Initiatives which continue to build civic engagement and demonstrate the benefits of the rule of law will help consolidate citizen’s faith in the peace process; 87 percent of people in Aweil are certain that civilians will disarm if the justice system works for everyone.

Figure 29: Positive drivers of R-ARCSS in BOR






Figure 30: Negative drivers of R-ARCSS in BOR



There is a strong sense that more wealthy landowners and cattle-herders are reluctant to fully support the peace agreement. It is possible that this local elite see the peace process as threatening their interests. Bor is also one of the regions where political tribalism and cultural distance undermine inter-group harmony. This mix of factors could be an enduring obstacle to peacebuilding efforts since influential economic elites may play a role in questioning the legitimacy of the peace process, especially if it begins to face challenges at the national level. Identifying potential peace process spoilers and addressing their concerns is crucial for winning broad support in Bor and needs to be tied to efforts to reduce

cultural distance and improve intergroup harmony. Entry points for consolidating R-ARCSS support can be seen through stronger civic engagement, while demonstrating the benefits of a peace dividend which consolidates hope in the peace process.

Figure 31: Positive drivers of R-ARCSS in BENTIU



Embracing gender parity is the main driver for supporting the peace process in Bentiu. The region shows that some work needs to be done to ensure women are equal to men in all walks of life. For example, 41 percent of people fully trust women leaders in the community, while 53 percent of people strongly agree that a woman can make a good Chief. 59 percent strongly agree that women should own land and 52 percent of people believe that it is acceptable for women to tolerate violence from their husbands. Clearly the elements of a deeper gender equality mindset exists in the region and given that this appears to be a strong driver for supporting the peace process, investing in efforts to broaden and deepen support for gender parity could go some way to increasing overall support or the peace process.

Hope is another key driver for support for the peace process, and with only 40 per cent of people definitively saying the peace process will bring benefits to their community the quality of hope is low in Bentiu. Reversing the deep scepticism about the peace agreement (71 percent of people need convincing the agreement is a good policy) will require efforts to show people how peace dividends can improve their lives. Policies and projects that promote a sense of shared civic and cultural identity, while demonstrating the economic and development benefits of peace, are key dimensions for a peacebuilding strategy. This will also go some way to increase hope (and therefore support) in the agreement.

The leadership role of the Chief can also be critical. SCORE results show that support for the peace process increases with support for a more active role for the Chief in community affairs. All the region’s Chiefs agree that politicians should work to implement the peace agreement in full, while advocating for key elements of R-ARCSS, such as treating all ethnic groups equally. Enhancing the role of Bentiu Chiefs can help set a path towards greater local support for the peace process. This would require demonstrating the benefits of the Chief’s role, while providing additional support to the Chief’s peace-making activities.

Figure 32: Positive drivers of R-ARCSS in RUMBEK





Figure 33: Negative drivers of R-ARCSS in Rumbek



In Rumbek wealthier individuals and cattle-herders tend to have lower support for the peace agreement, meaning that local economic elites may be concerned about how it impacts their status and interests. Rumbek citizens who desire a strong rule of law (civic adherence) and embrace participatory and inclusive civic engagement are committed to the peace process, with hope in the process also driving people’s support. Rumbek serves as a strong example for sustaining peace countrywide, making it essential to safeguard the strong support for R-ARCSS. To do this, it will be important to consolidate support for the agreement by ensuring people see peace dividends in the form of social, political and economic improvements. According to the region’s Chiefs, the key sources of conflict are inter-ethnic disputes, the availability of guns, weak conflict resolution mechanisms, poverty and corruption. Addressing these issues needs to be a priority to help ensure people do not become disillusioned in the peace process.

Figure 34: Positive drivers of R-ARCSS in YAMBIO





Figure 35: Negative drivers of R-ARCSS in YAMBIO



The strongest positive driver for support for the peace process is tied to increasing the role of the Chief. In Yambio this points strongly to empowering Chiefs to be local champions for the peace agreement and to use trust in local leaders as a vehicle for advancing initiatives which can overcome deep-seated mistrust of other groups (especially the Dinka) and of central authorities. Of the five regions Yambio has the lowest proportion of people (51 percent) who trust the state government to resolve inter-communal disputes. Gender equality mindset combines with other inclusive civic engagement practices and attitudes to establish a strong case for investments in improving participatory local governance as a safeguarding mechanism for the peace process.

Commitment to the peace process is strong in Yambio (9.2 out of 10) and investments in projects and policies which consolidate prosocial orientation and emphasizes the importance of a multi-ethnic national identity will help strengthen social cohesion. This approach should be used to constructively engage Yambio’s possible peace process spoilers who are characterised by high income levels and support political tribalism.

Constructive citizenship and the peace process

Figure 36 affirms the close relationship between peaceful citizenship and support for R-ARCSS, and other key constructive citizenship qualities. In strategic terms this set of correlations show that active citizenship and the preference for dialogue – both strong civic engagement characteristics – help to underwrite support for the peace process. In this respect it is also unsurprising that people who desire the rule of law through civic adherence and peaceful citizenship are also going to be strong advocates for removing guns from civilian life. This reflects the desire for people to see social peace as an outcome of the political process but at the same time the durability of the political process is dependent on people seeing tangible peace dividends in the form of the societal improvements such as the rule of law, reduction in gun violence, civic engagement, peaceful dispute resolution and education.

Figure 36: Constructive citizenship qualities associated with support for R-ARCSS

Peaceful Citizenship	0.39
Support for reducing guns	0.39
Tendency to respond with dialogue, not violence	0.37
Active Citizenship Orientation	0.15

Note: A value of +0.2 or above denotes a very strong significant relationship.

SCORE results do not identify any significant relationship between awareness of R-ARCSS and support for R-ARCSS. Therefore, a person's level of support for the agreement is not affected either positively or negatively by awareness of the contents of the agreement. This means most people support the agreement, in part or in full, without really knowing what it is they endorse. From a civic engagement perspective poor knowledge of the agreement is a liability for the peace process. Studies show that low level of peace agreements may invite rejectionist elements which weaken the understanding and the legitimacy of the agreement¹³. Good popular knowledge of the peace helps safeguard the process from spoilers and detractors who will seek to turn people against the agreement.

SECTION B: POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Sustain people's faith in the peace process

People's support for the peace process is strongly tied to people's hope and expectation the peace process will bring improvements to their quality of life. This hope is associated with the restoration of the rule of law and the vision of a society where the benefits of citizenship does not depend on ethnicity; there is a strong desire for inclusive civic identity embedded in supporting R-ARCSS. It is essential that the government and international donors invest in tangible social and economic improvements which demonstrate that the peace process is leveraging social impacts that can be shared by everyone regardless of their ethnic affiliation. Improved food security and improved gender parity can also be expected to drive support for R-ARCSS, while at the same time they are clear development outcomes which reflect tangible benefits of the peace agreement.

People desire strong and equitable local good governance

The strength of association between peacefulness, as a citizenship trait, and support for the peace process is a critical finding. Both outcomes are underwritten by the same good governance and civic engagement characteristics, which cluster around active citizenship, the rule of law and local leadership through the Chief. This points towards building local capacities for safeguarding the peace process which must involve investing in civic engagement projects that embraces inclusive participation in civic affairs. This may include incentives for volunteerism, better local dispute resolution through dialogue and improved service delivery. Civic engagement must also include improving people's knowledge of the peace process and ensure communities fully understand the implications of R-ARCSS and its statutes. Strengthening the role of the Chief is a part of this strategy, where local leaders become custodians of the peace process in their local communities.

¹³ tech.newstatesman.com/guest-opinion/education-antidote-fake-news and www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Disinformation-in-Democracies.pdf

Address the concerns of potential peace process dissenters

About one-third of citizens are not fully convinced about the peace process and elements of the agreement. In addition, about 6 percent of people reject the agreement. Combined with the 18 percent of citizens identified in section A, who could potentially turn to violence, the danger of dissenting voices turning into violent rejection of the peace process needs to be taken seriously. People who indicate concerns about the peace agreement seem to be involved in cattle-rearing activities, support traditional tribal hierarchies and have good financial means. It is essential that these dissenting voices are engaged in a peaceful and constructive political dialogue. From this perspective the existing National Dialogue which was launched in 2017 needs to be deepened and used as the platform for listening to rejectionists and peace process disruptors. More political capital and other relevant incentives need to be used to make the implementation of R-ARCSS as inclusive as possible.

SECTION C: CIVILIAN DISARMAMENT

Decades of civil war has been fuelled by the flow of arms into South Sudan and their proliferation throughout society¹⁴. The circulation of weapons is a danger to basic fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to life. Critically, high civilian armament influences the way people experience community-level disputes, with 97% of people reporting a weapon was used when a violent incident occurred.¹⁵ Given the frequency of violent incidents this puts demilitarization at the top of the agenda for peace consolidation.

Civilian Disarmament is a core feature of the R-ARCSS and the peace process. The parties have agreed that *“Civilian areas shall be immediately demilitarized. This includes schools, service centers, occupied houses, IDP camps, protection of civilian sites, villages, churches, mosques, ritual centers and livelihood areas”*¹⁶. However, the history of post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding elsewhere in the world has shown that removing guns from highly militarized societies is difficult; it requires a process of cultural transformation, facilitated by human security and development needs. The UNDP-supported baseline assessment of civilian firearm holdings, violence, victimisation and perceptions of security in South Sudan (2016) demonstrates how the possession of firearms is strongly linked to the perceived need for self-protection. SCORE results affirm fears around a weak rule of law, intergroup conflicts, cattle raiding and protection of property as obstacles to civilian disarmament.

What drives militarization?

There are an estimated 601,000 firearms in the hands of civilians in South Sudan, translating to an average of 1.39 firearms per household.¹⁷ SCORE results suggest that most Chiefs believe around one in every twenty people own a gun. The National Small Arms Assessment concludes by saying that “efforts to address small arms proliferation in South Sudan must focus on the underlying drivers of the demand for weapons among civilians”.¹⁸ SCORE findings echo the assertion that South Sudan’s sustaining peace agenda cannot be achieved without resolving the socio-psychological insecurities which govern civilians’ possession and use of firearms, requiring both development and arms control approaches. This was illustrated in the Secretary-General’s Report on the Situation in South Sudan (11 December 2019), where it was reported that in “Lakes and Warrap, forced disarmament exercises have failed to increase confidence in the State security forces, and concerns over unequal disarmament have led communities to rearm as the migration season approaches”.¹⁹

SCORE results demonstrate that the perceived prevalence of gun ownership varies region-to-region, with communities in Aweil and Bentiu reporting marginal gun-related problems, while Rumbek, Bor and Yambio face considerable challenges.

¹⁴ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/02/-sp-africa-arms-dump-south-sudan>

¹⁵ National Small Arms Assessment in South Sudan, UNDP, 2017.


¹⁶ Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan 2.2.3.1

¹⁷ National Small Arms Assessment in South Sudan, UNDP, 2016, p.11

¹⁸ National Small Arms Assessment, UNDP, p.12

¹⁹ Situation in South Sudan, Report of the Secretary-General, 11 December 2019

Figure 37: Perceptions of violent crime




In Aweil and Bentiu, only 8 percent and 6 percent of respondents report gun use as a problem in their community. However, other kinds of crime such as robberies, gangs and assaults are noteworthy, though not as prevalent as in other regions. The nexus between gun ownership and use and high crime rates of all kinds is clear in Bor, Yambio and Rumbek. Apart from Aweil, local Chiefs in the SCORE study clearly identified guns as a major cause of conflict in the community. When correlated with the evidence from figure 37, which assesses citizens' perceptions of crime, it is clear that the prevalence of criminal activity and guns is a factor which undermines social cohesion. In Rumbek, the risk of gun use is the most cited "social dysfunctionality" - defined here as antisocial and/or abusive behaviour that impinges on the rights of others. In Yambio, the perception of prolific gun ownership and the fear this evokes in citizens is part of a wider pattern of social disorder, whereby all social ills are reported to a higher frequency. The fear of guns in Yambio is deepened by the presence of armed groups openly carrying weapons in public spaces and the knowledge that automatic weapons are freely available. Although there is no open conflict in Yambio residents' report firearms as a problem in equal measure to robberies, assaults and uncontrolled militias. The high level of anxiety felt by Yambio citizens is deepened by random acts of gun violence.²⁰

²⁰ Discussion with the Head of the UNMISS Field Office in Yambio, 18 September 2020.

It is recognised that there is an association between cattle raiding and militarisation²¹. Pastoral communities rely heavily on their cattle to eat, trade and marry, which renders cattle an asset, and highly sought-after. At the same time, they are relatively easy to kidnap, which has led to a culture of cattle raiding. In turn, this increases the pressure to defend cattle from potential raids. The cycle fuels a domestic arms race, which lends itself to gun ownership: once your neighbouring rivals have guns, it becomes necessary to also own guns in order to defend land and property. High bride prices, stimulated by traditional gender norms, also intensify the cattle-raiding arms race. The normalisation of civilian armament permeates into other types of crime within and between communities.

Figure 38: Perceptions of armed violence is more prolific in regions where intergroup tension is high



Regions with the highest intergroup tension are associated with the highest level of perception of the risk of armed violence: Yambio, Bor and Rumbek (figure 38). For example, in Yambio this relates to the memory of conflict and the fear that civilians (mostly Zande) would be caught in the crossfire if conflict were to resume between government and opposition forces. The mix of mistrust of outgroups and the easy availability of guns makes inter-group relations into a zero-sum game: one community will not surrender their weapons whilst the neighbouring community still possesses theirs. The presence of guns in a community, ostensibly to be used in defence of the community against an external threat, is of course a resource for armed violence within the same community where levels of domestic crime can be prolific.

²¹The militarization of cattle raiding in South Sudan: how a traditional practice became a tool for political violence, Journal of International Humanitarian Action, 2018, Wild et al: <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s41018-018-0030-y>

Support for gun reduction

The majority of citizens agree that society should be demilitarized, with citizens in all five regions showing strong support for reducing the number of guns in their community and the country.

Figure 39: “We should aim to reduce the number of guns in my community and in the country”.

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
Aweil	84%	6%	5%	5%
Bentiu	62%	12%	22%	3%
Bor	75%	23%	2%	-
Rumbek	90%	9%	-	-
Yambio	94%	5%	-	1%

The most unequivocal support for gun reduction is in Yambio, where gun ownership causes most problems in the community. However, in Bentiu and Bor there are significant portions of the population which express concerns about disarmament (figure 39). The reluctance to fully disarm is echoed in the National Small Arms Assessment, where 32% of people rejected the idea of giving up (all) their firearms under any circumstances²². In the SCORE assessment, 19% of respondents from across all five regions (those who did not strongly agree) expressed reservations about reducing guns in society.

Respondents understand the need, however, to replace the rule of the gun with the rule of law. Figure 40 shows how societal demilitarization is motivated mostly by faith in a functioning justice system, ahead of traditional “hard” security responses, such as increased police and army presence in communities²³. Even more significant, those people who are not unequivocal about giving up their guns still consider a strong justice system as being the most likely route for civilian disarmament. Emphasizing the role of hard security – the militarisation of police – is shown not to have the desired effect and often fails to create social peace²⁴. Studies show that in the long-term a highly armed police force forfeits police reputation. SCORE shows that though the desire to disarm is strong there is currently insufficient deterrence against committing cattle raiding or other violent crime, the persistence of which continues to drive gun ownership.

²² National Small Arms Assessment in South Sudan, UNDP

²³ SCORE did not ask citizens what would constitute an effective police force or an effective security environment but the overwhelming support for a strong justice system and the halt to cattle raiding implies a desire to see a non-militarized rule of law system. This is consistent with the overall majority support for reducing guns in the community.

²⁴ Militarization fails to enhance police safety or reduce crime but may harm police reputation, Jonathan Mummolo, September 2018, PNAS, <https://www.pnas.org/content/115/37/9181>

Figure 40: Do you think people would be more willing to give up guns if...

	Strongly agree	All other responses
The justice system works for everyone?	86%	85%
Cattle raiding and crime is stopped?	94%	70%
The roads are patrolled by the police and army?	77%	67%
There is an effective police force?	68%	59%

All other responses refer to those people **who did not strongly agree** with the proposition to reduce guns. In each case the right-hand figure shows the strength of support of this group towards each of the policy options suggested as a means to encourage disarmament.

In addition to understanding the institutional pre-requisites to civilian demilitarization, SCORE assessed the kinds of individual and societal capacities which would help lay the ground for a sustainable disarmament. Many of these speak to core civic qualities which have featured prominently in this report and are intimately connected to the successful implementation of other peace consolidation processes, affirming the 2016 UNDP study which pointed to removing the underlying drivers for the demand for guns. Across the board, the following civic and behavioural traits are characteristic of supporters of gun reduction. This indicates which traits need to be cultivated in order to boost support for gun control.

- *Hope and support for R-ARCSS:* Disillusionment with the peace process tends to go hand in hand with a desire to maintain the current state of civilian armament. In Aweil and Rumbek people who want to keep their guns also tend to have lower levels of hope for the success of the peace agreement.
- *Peaceful citizenship and growth mindset:* Those with the skills and preferences to resolve issues through dialogue than through violence also show greater commitment to gun reduction. NGO peace infrastructures also engender an inclination to reduce gun ownership.
- *Intergroup harmony and inclusive collaboration:* In Rumbek and Aweil (both Dinka majority areas), those who support gun control have significantly higher levels of Intergroup harmony. This implies that an important obstacle for rallying support for the reduction of guns will be to eliminate intergroup tensions.
- *Gender equality mindset:* Men and women are more-or-less equal in terms of their support for gun reduction. However, attitudes towards gender show a striking pattern: men and women who harbour traditionalistic attitudes to gender are more reluctant to support gun control. This is most noticeable in the case of Aweil, Bor and Rumbek, which suggests that traditional gender norms are associated with supporting the retention of guns. On the other hand, gender equality mindsets are more strongly associated with greater trust in outgroups.
- *Quality of Life:* In the two least cohesive states, Yambio and Bentiu, we see strong negative correlations between quality of life and support for gun reduction. This is evidence that people are more likely to support the status quo when it is working in their favour. Those with a higher economic status will need to see how gun reduction will benefit them in order to garner their support for disarmament. People with higher incomes and families associated with cattle herding are more likely to mistrust the peace process, while the implementation of R-ARCSS is strongly associated with civilian demilitarization.

SECTION C: POLICY IMPLICATIONS


Establish a functioning justice system

Hard security measures, such as police or army patrols risks harming the police's reputation in the long run, which could reduce the state's capacity to promote and sustain social cohesion. The focus should be on improving the legal framework, the impartiality and accountability of the justice system and taking measures to facilitate access for people with low literacy or low income. This will need to go hand-in-hand with some considered communications for reputation management. For example, Chief customary courts are perceived to discriminate against women and youth; perceptions of this kind will need to change.

SECTION D: INFRASTRUCTURES FOR PEACE

This section explores infrastructures of peace through a SCORE lens in an attempt to understand local capacities for sustaining peace. Formal peace infrastructures bring together the whole system of peace committees, stakeholder forums and early warning capacities at the local level with a design to prevent or manage conflict. Figure 41 maps out the various peace infrastructure actors most closely associated with resolving inter-communal disputes.

Figure 41: Who is most trusted to resolve inter-communal conflicts?



This constellation of peace infrastructure actors can be united under a common understanding of their role in a definition offered by the Berghof Foundation:

“Peace infrastructures consist of diverse domestic, inter-connected forms of engagement between conflict parties and other stakeholders. Their organisational elements can be established at all stages of peace and dialogue processes, at all levels of society, and with varying degrees of inclusion. The objective of peace infrastructure is to assist the parties (e.g. through capacity building or advice), the process (e.g. through mediation between the conflict parties or facilitation of public participation), or the implementation of process results (e.g. through monitoring and coordination of agreement implementation)”²⁵.

The SCORE mapping of peace infrastructure actors measures the level of trust community members have of the respective actors’ ability to resolve conflicts between communities. Figure 41 denotes the level of *unequivocal* trust (Fully trust) and does not include responses which denoted a lower level of trust (Somewhat trust). In this way the analysis only focuses on the highest level of confidence people have in the institutions which bear the responsibility for sustaining peace. In many cases the aggregate of “fully trust and somewhat trust” implies a very high level of confidence but this approach has the danger of overlooking the nuanced reservations people may have of their peace infrastructure institutions.

This is particularly important to note in several cases but in Yambio the distinction between full and somewhat trusting peace infrastructures is sometimes quite stark. For example, the percentage of Yambio residents which fully trust NGOs, UNMISS, international development organisations and neighbours is between 6-7 percent, but in all cases anywhere between 75-89 percent of people “somewhat” trust these actors. The absence of unequivocal trust of these actors, which would be expected to enjoy high levels of support from communities is an interesting finding. On the other hand, Yambio citizens report high levels of mistrust (fully mistrust and somewhat mistrust) towards state bodies responsible for the rule of law, shown in figure 42 below. The level of mistrust in these institutions is unique to Yambio and it is telling that the most trusted peace infrastructure actor in the region is the religious community; religious leaders receive a 77 percent approval rating. In relative terms the Chief (56 percent approval rating) and women leaders (37% approval rating) are the next most trusted conflict resolution actors.

Figure 42: Levels of mistrust towards state and rule of law bodies in Yambio

	Somewhat mistrust	Fully mistrust
Customary courts	48%	9 %
State courts	42%	9%
State Government	42%	7%
County Commissioner	36%	6%
Police	28%	24%

²⁵ https://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Dialogues/dialogue10_peaceinfrastructures_complete.pdf

Overall, rule of law state bodies (Courts and the police) are well regarded in Aweil and Bor, but much less so in Bentiu. International organisations (UNMISS and development agencies, including UNDP) are the most trusted peace infrastructure actors in Bentiu, closely followed by NGOs, women leaders and religious leaders. It is significant that the communities (Bentiu and Yambio) with the lowest social cohesion scores also express the least confidence in the state authorities charged with managing and preventing conflict. In these locations citizens are placing their trust in international agencies and civil society to manage inter-communal tensions and conflict. In this regard the institution of the Chief and the Peace Committee stand out as the critical arbiter of inter-communal relations. On the other hand, religious leaders and women leaders are well positioned to support peace infrastructures.

When this analysis was done through the lens of the critical group of citizens who are as likely use violence as peaceful methods to resolve conflict, SCORE affirms the general observation that non-state actors are more credible as trusted resolvers of inter-communal disputes. People in this group are more likely to live in communities where trust in state institutions, international organisations and social bodies like NGOs is lower. On the other hand, religious leaders and clerics are strongly trusted, suggesting that a targeted strategy which positions religious leaders as peace ambassadors will help this crucial group of citizens to firmly embrace constructive civic engagement tools for resolving conflict.

The role of women and gender parity in underwriting peace infrastructures

SCORE shows that cultivating a gender equality mindset is a major peace infrastructure value which can underpin the peace process and local conflict resolution mechanisms. However, women are an untapped resource, denying South Sudan's social cohesion agenda one of its greatest assets.


As is the case in processes of social, political and economic change worldwide, South Sudan's women appear to play a marginal role. Across all five regions, women are excluded from civic opportunities as they report lower levels of civic engagement compared to men and less aware of social and political issues as well as rules and laws in the country. Bentiu is the only region where women are more engaged, willing to be active, and have higher information consumption than men. Bor and Rumbek are regions where women are especially unaware of the contents of R-ARCSS, though this does not translate into lower support or hope in the peace process. In general women are less likely to be informed of the political development shaping their lives, with 46 percent of women reporting they never listen to the news compared to 34 percent of men.

Women are overall less educated and are less skilled. According to World Bank data from 2018 female adult literacy (over 15 years) was 29 percent²⁶. Fifty-six percent of women in the SCORE survey reported they have never attended school, compared to 37 percent of men. Skills related to business planning, finance, and computer literacy are low but also basic skills linked to numeracy and literacy are poor among women. The low level of female education exists in spite of the fact that the vast majority of parents in all regions believe

²⁶ <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.FE.ZS?locations=AF-SS>

both boys and girls should receive a good education. This is one example of the mixed picture painted by the gender analysis of the five regions.


Figure 43: Perception of gender-related issues in the five regions



Scores are ranked 0-10 with 0 showing a low perception of the phenomenon and 10 denoting a high perception among respondents.

Figure 43 shows that although there seems to be a healthy gender equality mindset across all regions (i.e. attitudes and actions which afford equal rights and opportunities to people of all genders) there are major factors which negatively impinge of the lives of women. Of major concern many women are conscious of the threat of sexual and gender-based violence, with many women believing that the phenomenon is prevalent in their community. In particular, most women in Bor and Yambio believe that SGBV occurs in their community. Sustaining the traditional male role in the community is especially strong feature in Bentiu, Rumbek and Yambio, and has been identified as one of the key drivers undermining intergroup harmony. In Bor support for traditional male roles combines with political tribalism and cultural distance to discourage building trust between the majority Dinka and other ethnic groups.

Figure 44: Negative drivers of intergroup harmony in Bor



However, this discouraging picture partially obscures the potential of gender parity values helping to establish the space for social cohesion and a sustaining peace agenda. The cultivation of a gender equality mindset is a driver for the peace process, especially in Bentiu

and Yambio. In addition, figure 45 shows that overall women enjoy a high level of trust as community leaders, while figure 46 shows that most people in all the regions would trust women and youth organisations to address conflicts within the community and between communities.

Figure 45: Trust in Women Leaders in my community






Figure 46: Percentage of people who trust youth and women's organizations to resolve conflict



This trust in women to address social issues possibly does not extend to the realm on managing community political relations, and figure 47 shows varying levels of support for female Chiefs, with the strongest support being in Bentiu and the weakest support in Yambio and Aweil. This reflects the lower level of women’s participation in civic affairs compared to men. SCORE shows that 39 percent of women have never solved a conflict in their community, compared to 23 percent of men, and 34 percent has never participated in

community meetings to make important decisions about the community compared to 24 percent of men.

Figure 47: A woman would make a good chief for my community



SCORE identified six women Chiefs across the 5 regions in Aweil, Bentiu and Yambio²⁷, and although this is a small sample the findings indicated that these women Chiefs lead communities with more positive feelings and trust towards outgroups. The citizens in these women-led Bomas are also more supportive of R-ARCSS and of gun reduction, while overall being more aware of the provisions in the peace agreement. As this report has shown Chiefs exercise a huge degree of influence in their respective communities, and even this small sample demonstrates the positive influence of women community leaders.


Peace committees

Grassroot peace committees play an important role in recognizing, resolving, and preventing local conflicts²⁸. In South Sudan Peace Committees have been established to help resolve local conflict and though overall Chiefs perceive the Peace Committee as inclusive and effective (figure 48), there is sense these conflict resolution bodies need more resources to successfully carry out their work. For example, Chiefs in Yambio are more sceptical about the effectiveness of the Peace Committees, with this region apparently in most need for additional resources to resolve conflicts. The lack of resources is a common theme shared across all regions, though Aweil seems to do better.

²⁷ Women Chiefs are in Ayuang, Marchar Kunyuk Blo (Aweil); Hai Kokora 2, Yabongo 3, Ngindo 2 (Yambio) and Bimruok 2 (Bentiu).


²⁸ Toolbox on the role of Local Peace Committees in peacebuilding, ZOA International, <https://www.zoa-international.com/toolbox-to-facilitate-critical-reflection-on-the-role-of-local-peace-committees-in-peacebuilding/>

Figure 48: Chief's Perception of the Peace Committee on a scale of 0-10, with 10 showing the strongest performance



The Peace Committees enjoy a relatively high level of trust from the local community (figure 49), although in Yambio the Chiefs' concerns of Peace Committees' effectiveness is shared by the local community. Most people in Aweil and Bor (90 percent and 86 percent respectively) rely on the Peace Committee to solve conflicts with neighbouring communities but are less likely to turn to them to resolve intra community disputes. The Peace Committee in Bentiu and Rumbek plays an important role in resolving both inter and intra-communal disputes.

Figure 49: Community's trust in the Peace Committee




The role of the Chief

During the calibration phase of the South Sudan SCORE (September 2019) key informants indicated that the authority of Chiefs and Elders was declining, while their role in supporting social cohesion and influencing the direction of the peace process was not significant. The argument that conflict and militarization had eroded the authority of Chiefs was pervasive. We decided to test this assertion through the SCORE methodology in the five regions.

The evidence from the data is that Chiefs continue to be important figures at the local level and their positive peaceful citizenship influence will be key to sustaining peacebuilding and reconciliation agendas. This finding is particularly relevant where SCORE results show that people who support the increasing role of the Chief is associated with increased support for the peace process. With all Chiefs declaring their support for the implementation of R-ARCSS, they are clearly important champions for the peace process at the local level.

Figure 50: People say their Chiefs are the most important authority



Overall, people are optimistic about the efficacy of the Chiefs in their region and their political independence. In general, all communities indicate the chiefs are the most important authority (figure 50 above). Figure 51 demonstrates that people also assess their Chiefs quite positively, with the noticeable exception of Yambio, where Chiefs earn an efficacy score of 4.4 (compared to the average of 7.3). In spite of this almost half the community in Yambio (49 percent) want the Chief to have more responsibility. Only 5 percent of Yambio residents strongly agree their Chiefs have the authority to their jobs, with most people indicating there is need to increase their local leaders' powers in the community. In Aweil 57 percent of people believe their Chiefs power and responsibilities should be increased. In Bentiu 61 percent of people are not fully convinced the Chiefs have all the powers they need to their job, although only 30 percent advocate for giving the Chiefs more powers to play a central role in society.

Figure 51: Community perspective: efficacy of the Chief




Figure 52 and figure 53 portray Chiefs’ self-assessments, with percentages relating to the number of responses from Chiefs surveyed for the SCORE study. Together this shows the extent to which the expansion of the state has impacted the role of the Chief, especially when it comes to resolving conflict. In several cases the Chief believes that state authorities took precedence in resolving issues, while other factors undermining their authority include the proliferation of guns, the breakdown of the rule of law, the impact of civil war and lost respect for traditional authority.

Figure 52: Chiefs’ own assessment of what undermines their authority

Expansion of local government and state institutions	98%
Uncontrolled access and use of guns	91%
Formation of youth gangs who take the law into their own hands	87%
Breakdown of the rule of law	84%
Impact of the civil war	80%
Loss of respect for the role of traditional authority	78%

Figure 53: Chiefs' self-assessment

	Aweil	Bor	Yambio	Bentiu	Rumbek
Government bodies such as the state courts were responsible for resolving the dispute	93%	93%	100%	43%	34%
Powerful people prevented me from intervening, even though I felt I had the authority and the knowledge to resolve the conflict	7%	0%	100%	58%	0%
I received threats if I attempted to get involved in the resolution of the conflict	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%
I did not have the authority to intervene in the conflict	93%	67%	80%	12%	46%
I lacked the knowledge to provide good advice to the parties in the dispute	7%	60%	7%	42%	78%

Individual capacities to forgive and mental health

The SCORE index conducted an initial assessment of the individual capacity for reconciliation through the lens of forgiveness (figure 54). This showed a correlation between weak capacities to forgive, measured through the propensity of people to be vindictive and vengeful, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Section A of this report demonstrates how vindictiveness is a driver of readiness for violence and this link sheds light on one of the most concerning dimensions of conflict exposure in South Sudan. In this regard the severity of PTSD is associated with the different citizenship types described in this report. This shows that the strongest levels of PTSD are among the group of citizens that say they are as likely to use violence as they are to use peaceful means to resolve conflict (figure 55). The fact that this group is also the most civically engaged, demonstrates the importance of establishing a constructive citizenship framework for conflict transformation at the local level.

Figure 54: Feelings of vindictiveness




Figure 55: Level of PTSD among different citizenship types

Citizenship type	Most likely to be passive	Most likely to be peaceful	Most likely to respond violently	As likely to use violence as peaceful methods
PTSD SCORE out of 10	2.9	3.0	2.9	4.1

The score is measured on a scale of 0-10, with 0 denoting no PTSD and 10 showing the highest level of PTSD.

The premise that citizens who have the deepest commitment to civic engagement also show the highest propensity to suffer from PTSD and are more likely to use all means, including violence, to address conflict is a profound finding. It affirms the notion that South Sudan cannot fully benefit from the potential of its most constructive citizens until a process of psychological healing has taken place. It also implies that unattended PTSD is a possible hinderance to peacebuilding and reconciliation; a finding which has been studied extensively elsewhere. Results from a study on PTSD, published in the International Journal for Research in Social and Genetic Epidemiology and Mental Health Services²⁹, shows that 40.7% of South Sudanese participants met criteria for probable PTSD, and indicated respondents with probable PTSD were more likely to spontaneously report that confessions (41.2 vs. 28.3%) and apologies (32.3 vs. 23.7%) by perpetrators of crimes are necessary for reconciliation.³⁰

The potential of trauma to compromise efforts to reconcile and rebuild societies after violent conflict is increasingly recognised by the peacebuilding and development communities³¹. Studies from various countries have shown that people exposed to traumatic experiences run a greater risk of poor life outcomes, including compromised physical health, risky behaviours like dropping out of school or substance abuse, poor economic self-sufficiency or poor parenting skills for the next generation. Societies that have experienced long-term exposure to violent conflict undergo significant transformations which have lasting effects on individuals, communities and the state. Traumatized and anxious individuals find it difficult to stay focused in pursuing sustainable livelihoods strategies, while they are more likely to engage inappropriately or withdraw from social interactions, thus undermining prospects for community reconciliation and development. Similarly, ongoing mistrust between individuals and groups in the community creates an unfavourable environment for psychological healing and growth, while poverty and economic distress further exacerbate pre-existing symptoms of anxiety and depression. The net result of these mutual influences between the mental health, social cohesion and livelihoods has the potential to perpetuate an enduring pattern of conflict-related mental distress, pockets of enduring poverty and underlying social polarization.


²⁹ Lauren C. Ng, Belkys López, Matthew Pritchard, David Deng, Post-traumatic stress disorder, trauma, and reconciliation in South Sudan, Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, March 2017

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Katrien Hertog, The intrinsic interlinkage between peacebuilding and mental health and psychosocial support: The International Association for Human Values model of integrated psychosocial peacebuilding, 2017

In South Sudan the disinclination to forgive (level of vindictiveness) has a regional characteristic with the with Bentiu and Yambio potentially resisting reconciliation efforts. In Bentiu 66% of people stated, “When someone hurts me, I hurt them back”, and 93% of people said “I often act in a resentful manner to people who have wronged me”. People in Aweil, Bor and Rumbek feel the lowest tendency for revenge. Chiefs in the regions show different levels of vindictiveness with Chiefs in Yambio feeling the most resentful followed by Bentiu. The highest levels of PTSD (figure 56) are seen in Yambio and Rumbek with almost 85% reporting to have experienced or seen a severe traumatic event and approximately 90% having bad memories or dreams. SCORE results show that people with PTSD symptoms tend to have a lower income and are more likely to support traditional gender roles.

Figure 56: SCORE assessment of PTSD: Experience of traumatic events
(Sometimes, Often, Very Often)



SCORE findings highlight the potential of trauma in communities being exploited to incite future conflict and violence. The internal evidence of this report clearly shows that there is a segment of the population (18 percent of citizens) who are prepared to potentially use violence to resolve disputes, while 31 percent of people are not full convinced by the statutes of the peace agreement. At the same time possible peace process dissenters potentially hold influential positions in their local communities by virtue of their more privileged economic position or proximity to ethno-political loyalties. Thus, safeguarding the peace process is not only a matter of ensuring dissenting voices are managed through peaceful dialogue but also that personalized trauma does not hinder reconciliation and peacebuilding aims.

From this perspective, the finding that people who report they are more hopeful about the prospects for the peace process are associated with higher levels of forgiveness, and lower

levels of PTSD is a key future-oriented policy goal. It affirms the need to show people concrete peace dividends, which is a running theme of this report. It also links to constructive citizenship qualities associated with peaceful citizenship, family connectedness and a gender equality mindset. Other life skills, such as growth mindset, self-regulation and prosocial orientation are also linked to forgiving tendencies. This nexus suggests policy and programme directions intended to make citizens' hope in the peace process will be a valued commodity and points towards investments in livelihood programmes and vocational skills training, which run in parallel with programmes to improve mental health outcomes.

SECTION C: POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Support the role of the Chief to be a community leader for peace and development

SCORE confirmed the authority and personality of the Chief exercises significant influence on their communities' approach to the peace process and peaceful citizenship. Chiefs' support for and awareness of the peace agreement coalesce, and strong awareness of the peace agreement and its provisions translate into higher levels of awareness among the individual Chief's community members, implying pro-agreement Chiefs work hard to ensure his/her citizens understand the agreement. Communities trust their Chiefs and endorse a greater role for the Chief. Chiefs who can better demonstrate an ability to deliver peace dividends through local economic development will also be able to guide their respective communities towards peaceful citizenship and support for the peace agreement.

Enhance capacities for dispute resolution

There is a general understanding by local leaders and communities that existing conflict resolution mechanisms are weak, and in their current state, not fit for purpose. The desire to localise conflict resolution capacities is clear with people supporting the local authority of the Chief, while Chiefs articulated their wish to receive improved training in a variety of different peacebuilding and social cohesion disciplines. In addition, Peace Committees require adequate resources to be effective. Community reliance on local government institutions to resolve conflicts will depend on these bodies becoming more accountable, transparent and representative, and they would benefit from partnerships with trusted non-state actors such as religious leaders. Investment in strengthening peacebuilding capacities across authorities and other peace infrastructures should focus on critical life skill trainings focussing on counselling, negotiation and leadership, while developing skills to build consensus and translate participation into good local public policy.

Invest in the socio-psychological dimensions of peacebuilding

The extent of PTSD and its potential to hinder processes of national reconciliation is a serious challenge. The intrinsic interlinkage between peacebuilding and mental health and psychosocial support is internationally recognized. SCORE shows that PTSD undermines hope in the peace process and the quality of intergroup harmony. The negative

consequences of people struggling to recover from trauma could be severe for those attempting to implement R-ARCSS. Creating a bulwark against loss of faith in the peace process and addressing the individual traumas of citizens through professional and targeted counselling services needs to be a priority for peacebuilding programmes. The fact that people with PTSD appear to be prepared to participate in civic life needs to be used as a currency for peacebuilding efforts which also address individual mental health challenges. This points towards investments in livelihood programmes and vocational skills training, which run in parallel with programmes to improve mental health outcomes, especially in communities populated by the survivors of violence and life-changing conflict-associated trauma.

Strengthen the role of women in the peace process and remove barriers to the appointment of women Chiefs

Women are an untapped asset and resource for restoring and strengthening social cohesion and peace consolidation. SCORE evidence demonstrates that given the right kind of enabling environment women are effective community leaders which can navigate and embolden local peace infrastructures. This points to policies and programmes committed to building the capacity of women to exercise leadership in their communities, including removing barriers which prevent women from becoming Chiefs and taking on other senior state functions. Such barriers often include the burden of child-rearing and running the household, and practices which discourage women from fully participating in civic and political affairs. A commitment to improve the political participation of women at local and community levels is consistent with provisions in the R-ARCSS which supports a 35 percent quota for women in key state institutions³².

This should be accompanied by projects which seek to raise awareness about social and political issues among women, with a focus on demonstrating how the peace process responds to the issues which impact women's lives. For example, substantive community action in support of R-ARCSS Article 2.1.10.2, which prohibits sexual and gender-based violence, will help to embed local mobilisation around provisions in the peace agreement. This should include international donor support for women's organisations, which are already recognised as trusted and effective peace infrastructures in local communities.

Creating a more receptive climate for women Chiefs could be achieved by sharing stories of pioneers such as Magdalena Ehis Tito, who is one of the first female traditional leaders in South Sudan. Giving wide visibility to the experiences of women like Chief Magdalena could help empower women in all walks of life³³. UNDP's Access to Justice and Rule of Law programme is one example of supporting gender parity in a sector which is essential for strong social cohesion. The focus on female traditional leaders in traditional courts is helping to pave the way for fairer representation and marks a critical investment in

³² 1.12.2. In accordance with the agreed guarantee of 35% participation of women in the Executive, the Parties to the RTGoNU shall nominate no fewer than twelve (12) women to the Council of Ministers in line with Article 1.4.4 above. Parties shall give due consideration to national diversity, including regional representation, in nominating their candidates.

³³ For more information, see <https://www.peacewomen.org/content/south-sudan-south-sudans-sole-female-traditional-chief-fights-equality>

transforming community attitudes to women leaders and decision-makers³⁴. With SCORE findings showing that people who have a stronger commitment to gender equality supporting the peace process, the full political and civic participation of South Sudanese women is indispensable for the country's future peace and development.

³⁴ For more information, see <https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/ourstories/female-traditional-leaders-pave-the-way-in-south-sudan.html>

ANNEX I: METHODOLOGY



What is the Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index?

SCORE is an evidence-based peacebuilding and development methodology, which combines an extensive participatory research process with advanced data analysis to identify the drivers of conflict dynamics and peaceful social change. It draws inspiration from multiple scientific disciplines such as sociology, psychology, international relations and security studies and is flexible enough to incorporate new

research findings, global policy guidelines and the realities of each local and regional context. The methodology is underpinned by a process framework, which ensures local ownership of project results and helps align research objectives with the specific policy outcomes of different partners.

The SCORE Index uses a mixed-methods participatory research approach and relies on multi-level stakeholder consultations, focus groups and interviews to inform the calibration of the SCORE questionnaire (QNR). The QNR draws from the extensive SCORE library of measurement instruments and indicators. The approach helps ensure the SCORE results are built on the basis of a wide-ranging set of inputs and extensive data-driven insights. The SCORE Index can flexibly integrate different modalities of data collection as required and draws its strength from advanced analytical and statistical toolkits. Using participatory research principles, SCORE results are interpreted through multi-level stakeholder consultations and dialogue groups, which inform further data analysis and design of participatory policy briefs, which provide suitable policy and programme outlets for recommendations which can be owned by national stakeholders. The credibility of the SCORE results resides in the framework of cooperation between key stakeholders, allowing for the implementation of broadly supported public policy decisions which derive from the process.

The SCORE process, which is instrumental in ensuring national ownership of results. The following sequence is typical of SCORE projects which have been implemented around the world and was used to develop this first policy output of the South Sudan SCORE project.

The SCORE for South Sudan was calibrated in September 2019, involving a field assessment mission to Juba. During the mission the SeeD team consulted with key informant stakeholders, developed a conceptual map for the SCORE, selected the appropriate data collection tools and designed the sample frame. The goal of calibration is to establish a coherent research framework which incorporates different stakeholder perspectives, socio-economic challenges and competing hypotheses about root causes of socio-political tensions and obstacles to inclusive economic growth and human development.

Data Collection

The QNR serves as the principal data collection tool, while the sample frame is designed to ensure results can be reported for different sub-regions within the country, and for specific demographic and social groups. Data collection is conducted in collaboration with established researchers or research agencies, who must display cultural awareness and sensitivity to ensure a reliable data collection process. There were two separate phases of data collection in South Sudan. The first was conducted in the regions of Aweil, Bor and Yambio between 1 November and 10 December 2019. The second phase was administered in the regions of Bentiu and Rumbek between 23 March and 15 April 2020. The second phase was interrupted due to restrictions on interstate travel imposed by the government in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Data collection was resumed only in Rumbek on 12 June and the full survey was completed on 15 June 2020. This was not possible for Bentiu where only 9 of 15 clusters were completed.

The timing of the two phases of data collection is expected to have an effect on responses, as both the psychosocial state of individuals and their livelihoods strategies tend to vary with seasons. This may be more acute in areas which go through more extreme cycles of drought or plenty. Areas which were surveyed closer to April may therefore have worse scores than areas which were surveyed earlier, because April in South Sudan tends to be the time of year where food stores begin to run low, until the next harvest in September. Furthermore, the dry season (October to March) may also be associated with higher levels of cattle raiding or violence driven by water or food scarcity.

A total of 1,380 surveys were administered to randomly selected individual respondents, 690 surveys were administered to purposely selected respondents which represented community attitudes, and 69 surveys were administered to chiefs (total of 2,139 completed). To create a multi-level analysis 3 parallel surveys were administered among 69 Bomas in the five SCORE pilot regions. The disruption caused by COVID-19 prevented the data collection company³⁵ from completing the originally agreed sample of 2,325 surveys, falling short by 186 surveys.

For the individual survey, within each of the five towns, eight urban and seven rural bomas were sampled, with a sample size of twenty citizens each. Scores were then calculated per

³⁵ Data was collected between 1 November 2019 to 12 June 2020 by Forcier Consulting, <https://www.forcierconsulting.com/>

town by weighting the score of each of the bomas by its populations. This approach was taken to better understand the community at the bomas level, since each bomas was also surveyed by interviewing 10 citizens using a community questionnaire and one chief (or equivalent leader of the boma). Some very large bomas were broken down into segments and treated as bomas, with the chief survey being administered to deputy chiefs.

Boma locations sampled

Town	Boma	Type	Individual	Community	Chief
Aweil	Ayung	Urban	20	10	1
Aweil	Hai Salam	Urban	20	10	1
Aweil	Haya Toich	Urban	20	10	1
Aweil	Machar Kunyuk Blo	Urban	20	10	1
Aweil	Madiria	Urban	20	10	1
Aweil	Malou-Aweer	Urban	20	10	1
Aweil	Mathiang 2	Urban	20	10	1
Aweil	Zirah	Urban	20	10	1
Aweil	Mathiang	Rural	20	10	1
Aweil	War-Rak	Rural	20	10	1
Aweil	Ajuet Alel	Rural	19	9	1
Aweil	Aweil Alel	Rural	20	10	1
Aweil	Panjap	Rural	20	10	1
Aweil	Apada	Rural	20	10	1
Aweil	Udhaba	Rural	20	10	1
Bor	Arek 1	Urban	20	10	1
Bor	Bor-Town 1	Urban	20	10	1
Bor	Bor-Town 2	Urban	20	10	1
Bor	Bor-Town 3	Urban	20	10	1
Bor	Langbar	Rural	20	10	1
Bor	Pakua 1	Urban	20	10	1
Bor	Pakua 2	Urban	20	10	1
Bor	Jarwong	Urban	20	10	1
Bor	Arek 2	Urban	20	10	1
Bor	Gaak-Yuom	Rural	20	10	1
Bor	Panapet	Rural	20	10	1
Bor	Tuonygeau	Rural	20	10	1
Bor	Gak	Rural	20	10	1
Bor	Kolnyang	Rural	20	10	1
Bor	Mareng	Rural	20	10	1
Yambio	Hai Kokora 1	Urban	20	10	1
Yambio	Hai Kokora 2	Urban	20	10	1
Yambio	Timbiro 1	Urban	20	10	1
Yambio	Timbiro 2	Urban	20	10	1

Yambio	Timbiro 3	Urban	20	10	1
Yambio	Yabongo 1	Urban	20	10	1
Yambio	Yabongo 2	Urban	20	10	1
Yambio	Yabongo 3	Urban	20	10	1
Yambio	Ngindo 1	Rural	20	10	1
Yambio	Ngindo 2	Rural	20	10	1
Yambio	Saura	Rural	20	10	1
Yambio	Bazungua 1	Rural	20	10	1
Yambio	Bazungua 2	Rural	20	10	1
Yambio	Bodo 1	Rural	20	10	1
Yambio	Ndavuro	Rural	20	10	1
Bentiu	Bilnyang 1	Urban	20	10	1
Bentiu	Bilnyang 2	Urban	20	10	1
Bentiu	Bimruok 1	Urban	20	10	1
Bentiu	Bimruok 2	Urban	20	10	1
Bentiu	Bimruok 3	Urban	20	10	1
Bentiu	Bimruok 4	Urban	20	10	1
Bentiu	Hai- Ingass	Urban	20	10	1
Bentiu	Kalebalek	Urban	20	10	1
Bentiu	Nying 1	Rural	20	10	1
Rumbek	Abeer 1	Urban	20	10	1
Rumbek	Abeer 2	Urban	20	10	1
Rumbek	Abeer 3	Urban	20	10	1
Rumbek	Abeer4	Urban	20	10	1
Rumbek	Abeer 5	Urban	20	10	1
Rumbek	Cholocok	Urban	20	10	1
Rumbek	Nyangkoot 1	Urban	20	10	1
Rumbek	Nyangkoot 2	Urban	20	10	1
Rumbek	Adol 1	Rural	20	10	1
Rumbek	Adol 2	Rural	20	10	1
Rumbek	Adol 3	Rural	20	10	1
Rumbek	Adol 4	Rural	20	10	1
Rumbek	Apeet 3	Rural	20	10	1
Rumbek	Apeet 1	Rural	20	10	1
Rumbek	Apeet 2	Rural	20	10	1

Note: Due to resource constraints the project did not survey deep rural areas of the respective states, and this is acknowledged as one of the limitations of the study, since opinions of citizens in deep rural areas were not captured during this pilot initiative. On the other hand, since the urban and rural areas around the five towns surveyed contain citizens who most frequently come into contact with institutions and who most intensely participate in the country's economic and sociopolitical life, such a town-centred sample reflects the community dynamics and the social cohesion challenges which South Sudan will face in the coming years.

Multi-Level Statistical Analysis

Our conceptualization of social cohesion in South Sudan includes a wide variety of personal, communal and institutional phenomena. This multi-level understanding of social dynamics in social cohesion emerged from the calibration process described above. As a result, we sought to explain social cohesion by investigating factors which contribute to resilience and peaceful citizenship (or lack thereof) at two levels: the individual and the communal. We measured personal attitudes and ideologies (such as attitude towards other ethnic groups, or perceptions about gender equality), communal relations and boma-specific phenomena (such as the intergenerational harmony or the level of services and assets that a Boma possess) and attitudes and behaviours of the Chiefs of each Boma.

To achieve this objective three parallel QNRs were administered to individual, community and chieftain respondents, as described above. The three parallel surveys were designed to assess social and political factors associated with sustaining peace outcomes. The first survey was administered to a random selection of 20 individuals in each Boma and focused on subjective choices, attitudes and experiences, such as support for the peace agreement or individual approaches to conflict resolution. The second survey was administered to 10 people in each boma and explored issues relating to community level assets and processes which shaped individual experiences. This included questions which assessed public services, the quality of community leadership and the nature of civic activism. The third survey was administered to Chiefs in the selected Boma, who provided their personal perspectives on a range of social, economic and political issues. The 3 surveys broadly tested different dimensions of social and political life, with selected questions featuring in all 3 instruments.

We aggregated individual responses to calculate a score for each Boma, using advanced data analysis techniques, to capture the quality of citizen-state relations, intergroup dynamics, psychosocial functioning and civic behavioural traits. This allowed us to use a multi-level approach to assess both individual and communal factors influencing individuals' responses to questions in the survey. This provided a deeper understanding of why an individual would select a particular answer or proposition, reflecting both an individual value and community (Boma level) contextual reality.

Examples of multilevel analysis can be found throughout this policy document. For example, although individual skills are very important drivers of peaceful citizenship and supporting R-ARCSS, we also identified factors which reside at the community level that influence a particular outcome of interest. This layered approach to measuring social cohesion means we can triangulate results, ensuring their robustness. A relationship which has been discovered through multiple independent measurements (i.e. from the two levels of the study) reveals an underlying reality that may be leveraged to identify insightful policy and programme recommendations.

ANNEX II: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Although the policy departure point for the South Sudan SCORE is the R-ARCSS, it is clear that identifying and understanding the optimal trajectories for supporting the reconciliation dimensions of the agreement require a broader understanding of the relationship between the citizen and the state. From this perspective, SCORE results seek to understand and explain drivers for constructive citizenship traits in support of the implementation of the R-ARCSS. We understand constructive citizenship as a broad concept underpinned by political philosophy and a body of international law, established over several decades. It intersects with the notion of a social contract between the citizen and the state where “individuals consent, either explicitly or tacitly, to surrender some of their freedoms and submit to the authority (of the ruler, or to the decision of a majority) in exchange for protection of their remaining rights or maintenance of social organization/social order”.³⁶

The extensive involvement of civil society organisations, women, youth and internally displaced persons, in the governing structures of the TGoNU demonstrates the value attached by the framers of the South Sudan peace process on citizen engagement in the process of conflict transformation. The SCORE project intends to define the kind of relationship between citizens and the state, and between different social groups within society, which facilitates and sustains peace outcomes. This approach is already consistent with various standards for state-society relations established by the international community, including the outcome of the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in December 2011 in Busan (Korea), recommendations from the Rio+20 Conference, which were adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2012, and the New Deal Peacebuilding and State Building Goals.

The multi-level analysis is designed to map the individual drivers of different kinds of citizenship (peaceful, constructive, passive and violent) and the contextual drivers which shape the enabling environment in which citizenship choices are exercised. Our initial hypothesis is that successfully implementing the R-ARCSS depends on citizens’ capacities to claim rights which can shape an inclusive development-oriented environment, underpinned by responsive governing institutions which have the legal and moral obligations to establish the regulatory and resource framework that provides opportunities for individuals to function freely and aspire to fulfil the requirements for individual and collective well-being. SCORE looks at different citizenship choices, and the multi-level analysis seeks to understand the interaction between individual and contextual drivers of citizenship choices which will impact the peace process.

³⁶ https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/bitstream/handle/10871/18609/Castiglione_Introduction.pdf?sequence=1